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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Recent social science research has made significant progress in understanding what 
motivates people to prepare for hazards, but the floodplain management community has not 
effectively used this research to inform its public education programs. This paper draws on 
“actionable risk theory” to advance a theoretical framework for flood preparedness education. 
The framework identifies best practices for flood education, and suggests actions that encourage 
“milling” behaviors among citizens. In order to motivate collective, rather than only individual 
responses to risk, the framework also builds on social network and social movement research to 
propose activities that help build a “community identity around risk.” Through a review of 
education programs in the earthquake sector of the natural hazards community, this paper 
demonstrates how some components of this framework are already working to motivate 
preparedness. Finally, reviewing past flood education efforts, it recommends ways to improve 
flood programs so they better motivate preparedness. 
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     “We're all in this together.” 
- Earthquake Country Alliance slogan 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 At 10:20 a.m. on October 20, 2011, the Great California ShakeOut – a voluntary, 
mock earthquake readiness drill – took place throughout the state of California. For the 
drill, more than 8.5 million individuals simultaneously engaged in a “Drop, Cover, Hold 
on” exercise, wherever they were at that time.1 Schools, hospitals, corporations, small 
businesses, daycares, religious groups, families, individuals and other organizations 
registered in advance to participate in what is now recognized as the nation’s largest 
preparedness drill.  And they not only participated, they also shared photos of themselves 
online afterward, crouched beneath desks and tables, or engaged in other preparedness 
actions to spread the word about what they had done. Even in an era of flash mobs and 
social media mobilization, this extent of public participation is astounding, especially 
when considered in light of social science findings that suggest people do not readily 
prioritize preparedness for future, possible, and seemingly distant risks. 
 In contrast, in 2011, when storm predictions for Hurricane Irene and Tropical 
Storm Lee forecast some of the most significant amounts of rainfall and tremendous 
hurricane-force winds to reach the East Coast of the United States in many years, a huge 
public debate waged in newspapers and social media sites. Analysts and individuals 
living in the affected region suggested that the event was being over-hyped by media 
outlets urging people to prepare. They questioned whether the talk of readiness was really 
                                                 
1
 Southern California Earthquake Center, "The Great California ShakeOut." 
 http://www.shakeout.org/california, (accessed July 25, 2012). 
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necessary, or if it was instead a ploy to increase media ratings.
2
 Hydrologists for the 
National Weather Service report that they still hear these complaints, even after those two 
events caused 58 deaths, and $8.2 billion dollars in damages and losses.
3
 The contrast of 
these two hazard-related events raises a critical question: why did the California 
ShakeOut engage so many people in a voluntary preparedness drill for a possible future 
risk, while the acute threat of an impending dangerous hurricane and consequent flooding 
was not enough to motivate others to prepare? 
 As the most common, costly and deadly natural disaster in the United States, 
flooding certainly warrants preparedness action.
4
 Estimates for economic losses from 
2011 floods alone in the Upper Midwest, along the Mississippi River, and the East Coast 
as a result of Hurricane Irene, topped $13.5 billion.
5
 Floods claim nearly 100 lives 
annually on average, and even these tremendous losses are dwarfed by those resulting 
from Hurricane Katrina in 2005, estimated now at $125 billion in economic damages, and 
                                                 
2
  J. Barron. “‘Some Hurricane,’ New Yorkers Grumble as Danger Passes,” New York Times, August 
 28, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/nyregion/after-the-storm-new-yorkers-complain-
 about-the-hype.html; Petula Dvorak, "Overhyped Irene makes Washington the inevitable butt of 
 snickers," Washington Post, August 28, 2012, sec. Local, 
 http://www.washingtonpost.com/local/overhyped-irene-makes-washington-the-inevitable-butt-of-
 snickers/2011/08/28/gIQA1eGglJ_story.html; Jack Mirkinson, "Hurricane Irene: Was Media 
 Coverage Overhyped?,” Huffington Post, August 29, 2011, sec. Media. 
 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/08/29/hurricane-irene-media-hype_n_940215.html. 
3
 Charles Perry, “Significant floods in the United States during the 20th century – USGS measures a 
 century of floods.” Fact Sheet 024-00. United States Geological Survey: Reston, VA, 2000. 
 http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2000/0024/report.pdf. 
4
 L.A. Avila & J. Cangialosi, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Hurricane Irene (AL092011),” National 
 Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), National Weather Service (NWS), National 
 Hurricane Center: Miami, FL, 2011; D.P. Brown, “Tropical Cyclone Report: Tropical Storm Lee 
 (AL123011),” NOAA, NWS, National Hurricane Center: Miami FL, 2011. 
5
  “Billion Dollar U.S. Weather/Climate Disasters,” NOAA, National Climatic Data Center: 
 National Environmental, Satellite, Data and Information Service,” 
 http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/reports/billionz.html#chron.  (last updated April 26, 2012,  accessed 
 January 14, 2012).  
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about 1,800 deaths.
6
  The specter of rising flood losses makes questions about the 
success, and failure, of flood education to motivate preparedness all the more urgent.  
Efforts to date have not overcome public resistance to preparing for natural hazards, and 
have failed to produce a prepared public even in the face of repetitive losses. What are the 
methods to overcome this resistance, and what steps should the floodplain management 
community take to improve outcomes for preparedness? 
 In this paper, I address these questions by proposing a new framework for flood 
education, one that calls for the creation of a “community identity around risk.” This 
framework applies findings from recent social science research (which I will refer to as 
“actionable risk communication theory or actionable risk theory”) about what motivates 
individuals to prepare for a wide range of hazards. It is predicated on the idea that 
creating a community identity around risk can successfully motivate preparedness 
actions.  Actionable risk communication theory draws on social science theories rooted in 
a “social diffusion” perspective, to provide the basis for establishing best practices for 
public education aimed at motivating people to prepare for exposure to hazards.
7
 The 
fundamental tenets of actionable risk communication theory have already been applied by 
the earthquake sector of the natural hazards community, and have garnered tremendous 
public response. This paper aims to transfer understanding from this theoretical research, 
and its applications, to the floodplain management field in order to improve outcomes for 
public preparedness for floods. 
                                                 
6
 S. T. Ashley & W. S. Ashley. “Flood fatalities in the United States,” Journal of Applied 
 Meteorology and Climatology 47, no.3 (2008): 805-818. DOI: 
 http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/2007JAMC1611.1;  A. Graumann, et al., “Hurricane Katrina: a 
 climatological perspective,” Technical Report 2005-01, NOAA National Climate Data Center, 
 Oct. 2005.  http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/?reports/tech-report-200501z.pdf  (updated August 
 2006.) 
7
 These theories, known as “diffusion of innovations” and “communications” theories, are discussed 
 further in Part III.  
5 
 
 The past several decades have seen tightened building standards and significantly 
improved flood warning technology. Despite these advances, flood losses in the United 
States are likely to rise in the future, not simply for climatic reasons but also as a result of 
societal demands on floodplains, such as dense population on coasts.
8
 Flood losses 
average nearly $8 billion annually in the United States.
9
 Multiple climate change 
assessments project a general future trend in the United States, that “wetter areas will get 
wetter,” with rising precipitation levels increasing the risk of flooding in already flood-
prone areas.
10
 Compounding the loss issue is increasing population density along both the 
East and West coasts, where flooding is most likely.
11
 
 The way these losses are distributed among the population creates even further 
challenges for the floodplain management community. Poorer populations are most 
vulnerable to floods, and often suffer the worst losses, not only because their financial 
assets are tied up primarily in their homes, but also because they are less mobile and must 
often make riskier choices about where to live.12 When higher-income individuals select to 
buy coastal or riverine properties in floodplains, they have the option of safer, primary 
                                                 
8 French Wetmore, et al., "The Evaluation of the National Flood Insurance Program, Final Report," 
 American Institutes For Research, 2006, p.9; Roger A. Pielke, Jr., Mary W. Downton, 
 “Precipitation and Damaging Floods: Trends in the United States, 1932–97.”  Journal of Climate 
 13 (2000): 3625–3637. DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.1175/1520-
 0442(2000)013<3625:PADFTI>2.0.CO;2   
9
 This figure is calculated over the 30-year period of 1980-2009.  “United States Flood Loss Report 
 – Water Year 2011,” (NOAA’s NWS Hydrologic Information Center Flood Loss Data.   
 http://www.nws.noaa.gov/hic/summaries/WY2011.pdf, accessed August 2, 2012). 
10
 Paul Durack, Susan G. Wijffels and Richard J. Matear, “Ocean Salinities Reveal Strong Global 
 Water Cycle Intensification During 1950 to 2000.”  Science 336, no. 6080 (April 27, 2012): 455-
 458. DOI: 10.1126/science.1212222. ; Thomas R. Karl, Gerald A. Meehl, Christopher D. Miller, 
 Susan J. Hassol, Anne M. Waple, and William L. Murray (eds). “U.S. Climate Change Science 
 Program (CCSP), 2008: Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing Climate. Regions of Focus: 
 North America, Hawaii, Caribbean, and U.S. Pacific Islands. A Report by the U.S. Climate 
 Change Science Program and the Subcommittee on Global Change Research.”  (U.S. Department 
 of Commerce, NOAA's National Climatic Data Center: Washington, D.C., 2008)  
11
  Durack, et al., p. 9. 
12
  Burrell E. Montz, “The generation of flood hazards and disasters by urban development on   
 floodplains,” In D.J. Parker, (ed.), Floods. (Routledge: London, 2000). pp. 116-127. 
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homes, adequate flood and property insurance, and sufficient access to flood warnings.  Poor 
communities do not. Current flood education efforts, which often rely on Internet 
dissemination, English-only materials, and incorrect assumptions about the motivations to 
prepare, do not have adequate methods for reaching these most vulnerable audiences.  
 Attention to environmental justice considerations related to flooding increased in the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, and the devastation that occurred in the primarily black and low-
income communities in Louisiana. Much of this research looks at the perceived inequities in 
the provision of resources after the catastrophe, rather than at the need to notify the public 
about their risks in advance.13 How to motivate low-income and marginalized populations to 
prepare for flooding hazards is still largely unaddressed in theory, and in practice. 
 In light of these significant flood-related threats and challenges, the floodplain 
management community in the United States has been calling for improved strategies to 
reduce flood losses.  For instance, at its 2004 Gilbert White Forum, the Association of State 
Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) called for a new paradigm in floodplain management, and 
President Obama issued in May 2009 a draft Executive Order that would tighten regulations 
for floodplain development.14 There is strong agreement among people in the floodplain 
management community that top-down regulatory approaches to flood loss mitigation 
alone are insufficient, and that improving public preparedness through education should 
be a priority.
15
 Historically, federal, state and local efforts have focused their energies on 
                                                 
13
 For an extensive review of literature related to Hurricane Katrina, see the Hurricane Katrina 
 Research Bibliography.  Kai Erikson and Lori Peek, “Hurricane Katrina Research Bibliography,” 
 Social Science Research Group, Task Force on Katrina and Rebuilding the Gulf Coast, 2010.  
 http://katrinaresearchhub.ssrc.org/KatrinaBibliography.pdf, (accessed August 2, 2012.)   
14
 United States Executive Office of the President, Draft Exec. Order, “Floodplain Management,” 
 version 0510/2009VI.    
 http://www.eenews.net/public/25/11835/features/documents/2009/07/21/document_gw_01.pdf 
 (accessed December 8, 2009.) 
15 For a good discussion on this topic, see Marshall Frech, “Flood Risk Outreach and the Public’s 
 Need to Know,” Journal of Contemporary Water Research and Education no. 130 (2005):61-69.   
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structural and land use approaches, as I detail below in Part II.  Few efforts in the United 
States have effectively coordinated public education about flooding to motivate 
preparedness at the household level, where much of  - and arguably, the worst of - the 
loss and devastation from flooding occurs. For both individuals and flood managers, an 
inadequate understanding about how to motivate preparedness is likely to blame. 
 The body of social science research I use to reason about this problem is the 
culmination of decades of work by Dennis Mileti (professor and director emeritus at the 
Natural Hazards Center at the University of Colorado at Boulder), and his colleagues, 
who have been studying “what works” in motivating people to prepare for a variety of 
hazards. Mileti and his colleagues propose a new model of preparedness that focuses on 
“communicating actionable risk” and demonstrating preparedness actions rather than the 
common practice of discussing risk in terms of empirical probabilities.
16
 Their research 
suggests that in order to encourage people to prepare, risk prevention and minimization 
programs should emphasize and incorporate “milling,” or the social process of seeking 
out information and reflecting upon it with neighbors, friends or family. In short, the key 
findings are that people are motivated to prepare by watching others prepare, and by 
learning about preparedness actions from those who have already prepared. Therefore, 
programs that promote milling will be more successful than those that focus on 
communicating risk probabilities. More generally, actionable risk theory suggests that 
efforts to educate the public about hazards, including flooding, have historically been 
based on the intuitions of program developers rather than evidence, and on an inaccurate 
                                                 
16
  Michele M. Wood, Dennis Mileti, M. Kano, M. M. Kelley, R. Regan, & L.B. Bourque. 
 “Communicating actionable risk for terrorism and other hazards.” Risk Analysis 32 (2011): 601–615. 
 DOI: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2011.01645.x 
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understanding of how the public responds to risk messages. 
 Mileti’s research holds much value for the floodplain management community, 
which is in need of a new framework for educating the public about flood risk and flood 
preparedness. In this paper, I will draw on this emerging actionable risk theory, as well as 
social movement and network theories, to argue how and why building a community 
identity around risk can further help educators to promote flood preparedness. My 
argument will draw on personal correspondence as well as programs and materials from 
the earthquake sector of the natural hazards community, which has deliberately shaped its 
public education programs on the basis of social science research. As previously 
mentioned, an important case study is the Great California ShakeOut, a state-wide 
earthquake preparedness drill (designed around actionable risk principles) that in 2011 
engaged more than 8.5 million people to participate in a mock earthquake exercise. By 
exploring how the leading earthquake organizations working in California today – which 
together comprise an applied model of preparedness education –  succeed in motivating 
public preparedness, I intend to demonstrate that those organizations have already begun 
to develop such a “community identity around risk.” In fact, the emergence of this 
community identity around risk explains an important part of their success. 
 In drawing lessons from earthquake preparedness to inform flood education 
programs, I will, in Part II, provide an introductory background on the floodplain 
management community, and its previous efforts to address flood losses. In Part III, I 
review the actionable risk theory and related natural hazards research to identify a series 
of best practices for motivating individual and household preparedness and to explain the 
incorporation of milling into education campaigns. Here I also draw on social movement 
9 
 
and network research to suggest how the creation of a community identity around risk 
(which moves beyond milling to include more explicit efforts at building group and 
collective identity) will further catalyze preparedness practices at the individual and 
community levels. In Part IV (Analysis and Recommendations) I systematically review 
both flooding and earthquake programs and materials to assess how each 1) incorporates 
best practices for demonstrating and motivating individual preparedness and 2) builds a 
community identity around risk.
17
 After this review, I make specific recommendations for 
improving flood policy and flood education campaigns to motivate stronger public 
preparedness.  Part V concludes the paper by drawing out the practical implications of the 
preceding discussion for certified floodplain managers, emergency managers, municipal 
and regional planning personnel, and non-profit organizations engaged in public 
education about hazards generally, and flooding in particular. 
PART II:   An Introduction to the Floodplain Management Community 
 Before building a theoretical framework to guide floodplain management 
programs, it will be helpful first to 1) define the floodplain management community; 2) 
outline briefly the history of floodplain management in the United States; and 3) identify 
some of the key challenges facing floodplain managers who want to educate the public.  
This section will address these issues in turn. 
What is floodplain management? 
 Floodplain management is a growing, specialized professional field that integrates 
knowledge from the scientific, public policy, and educational sectors in order to manage 
floodplains in a way that reduce losses from flooding. Some in the field debate whether 
                                                 
17
  The flood materials focus heavily on Texas, Colorado and the Delaware River Basin, which 
 comprises New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania and Delaware.  The materials were shared by the 
 Flood Safety Project of Boulder, Colorado for this research. 
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“floodplain management” is the most effective description of the field, but in recent 
years, it has become the most common term for the act of designing, maintaining and 
regulating floodplains in the United States.
18
 The concept supplants the now old-
fashioned idea of flood control, which assumed a man-made ability to control waterways.  
One of the most public organizations in the field is the Association for State Floodplain 
Managers (ASFPM). This organization has created a series of state-level chapters and a 
certification process for floodplain managers, who are often engineers whose professional 
work directly involves the management, design, and oversight of floodplains.
19
 For the 
purposes of this paper, the floodplain management community should be understood in 
its more informal sense, which includes certified floodplain managers as well as the 
following: municipal, state and federal employees; professional engineers; consultants; 
insurance agents; and rescue, recovery and counseling workers whose practices engage 
the management of floodplains or efforts to reduce flood losses. 
The History of Floodplain Management in the United States 
 Over many decades, the floodplain management community has substantially 
evolved its model for conceptualizing and reducing flood-related losses. As previously 
mentioned, the earliest policy efforts around flooding focused on flood control that 
involved engineering or other efforts to stop flood waters from reaching human-occupied 
                                                 
18
 “Floodplain” as a term is at the center of tremendous misunderstanding about flood risk and 
 frequency.  For the purposes of this paper, I will use Freitag’s definition of those lands that are 
 “physically, hydrologically or biologically connected to the main river channel.” Bob Freitag, 
 Susan Bolton, Frank Westerlund and J.L.S.Clark. Floodplain Management: A New Approach for a 
 New Era.Washington, DC: Island Press, 2009, p. 20.   
19
  Association of State Floodplain Managers, “Floodplain Management Body of Knowledge,”  
 Madison, WI: ASFPM Foundation, 2007.http://www.floods.org/ace-
 files/documentlibrary/CFM/ASFPM_Floodplain_Management_Body_of_Knowledge_12_15_07.p
 df/ (accessed August 2, 2012.) 
11 
 
areas.
20
 The Flood Control Act of 1936, which cemented the federal role in flood loss 
mitigation, identified $370 million worth of flood control projects (including 48 
reservoirs) and began a decades-long process of structural flood control projects under 
the purview of the Army Corps of Engineers.
21
 The legacy of these projects is a complex 
system of major and minor dams and levees across the country, many of which are aging, 
decommissioned, removed or maintained at great public and private expense.
22
 
 Two trends have pushed government actions toward increasing non-structural 
regulatory efforts in the area of flood control. The first is that these structural controls are 
often insufficient for safely preserving human life and property, and have deleterious 
effects on ecosystems and water quality.
23
 The second is the tremendous expense required 
to build and then maintain these systems over time.
24
 The most notable and important of 
the regulatory approaches is the National Flood Insurance Program (NFIP), which was 
established in 1968 and is now under the purview of the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA). The NFIP offers communities a chance to opt-in to subsidized flood 
insurance packages in exchange for adhering to a system of federal regulations on 
floodplain developments and structures. In more recent years, new federal regulatory 
programs have emerged, such as those that encourage the evacuation and purchase of 
                                                 
20
 For a good history of flood control efforts, see: Howard Rosen and Martin Reuss, eds., “The 
 Benefits and Costs of Flood Control: Reflections on the Flood Control Act of 1936,” p. 110 in The 
 Flood Control Challenge: Past Present, and Future. Chicago, Illinois: Public Works Historical 
 Society, 1988.  See also Freitag, et al. 
21
 Jamie W. Moore and Dorothy P. Moore, The Army Corps of Engineers and the Evolution of 
 Federal Floodplain Management Policy, p. 13. Institute of Behavioral Science, University of 
 Colorado, 1989.   
22
 American Society of Civil Engineers, “2009 Report Card for America’s Infrastructure: Water and 
 Environment, Dams,” http://www.infrastructurereportcard.org/fact-sheet/dams (accessed August 3, 
 2012).    
23
 William L. Graf, “Damage Control: Restoring the Physical Integrity of America’s Rivers,” 
 Presidential Address, Annals of the Association of American Geographers 91, no. 1 (2001):1-27. 
24
 Kenneth Rubin, “The New Federalism and National Flood Control Programs,” p. 135 in The 
 Flood Control Challenge: Past, Present, and Future. (Chicago, Illinois: Public Works Historical 
 Society, 1988).  
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repetitively flooded properties,
25
 and the reconstruction of deteriorated riparian buffers to 
put distance between the water and human development.
26
  These buy-out and restoration 
programs reflect a new trend in modern floodplain management, which no longer aims to 
control floods, but instead aims to “mitigate flood losses” and protect the “natural and 
beneficial functions of floodplains.”27 In short, the era of frequent and expensive 
engineering projects to reduce flood losses has passed, at least in significant measure, and 
is replaced with an era in which it is considered prudent to use other adaptive techniques 
to maintain the ecological health of rivers and watersheds, as well as to protect lives and 
property. 
Few of these newer non-structural efforts, however, have tried to educate the 
public about steps they can take to prepare for flooding. For instance, ASFPM's 2007 
comprehensive review of federal flood programs and policies – inclusive of agricultural, 
coastal, insurance, mapping, disaster response, mitigation and other programs - includes 
not a single program that has education as a primary or even substantial component.  
ASFPM makes clear its position on this issue: “The federal agencies, in collaboration 
with states, localities, and the private sector, must find clearer ways to communicate 
flood risk so that it is meaningful to citizens and communities, thus enabling them to take 
                                                 
25
 Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Severe Repetitive Loss Program,”  
 http://www.fema.gov/severe-repetitive-loss-program/ (accessed August 3, 2012.) 
26
 Many states offer riparian buffer restoration programs. Pennsylvania has included riparian buffer 
 restoration in its Pennsylvania Stormwater Best Management Practices Manual.  See: 
 Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection, “Pennsylvania Stormwater Best 
 Management Practices Manual,” 2006. Chapter 6, p. 191. 
 http://www.stormwaterpa.org/assets/media/BMP_manual/chapter_6/Chapter_6-7-1.pdf/ (accessed 
 August 3, 2012.) 
27
 Task Force on the Natural and Beneficial Functions of the Floodplain. The Natural &Beneficial 
 Functions of Floodplains: Reducing Flood Losses by Protecting and Restoring the Floodplain 
 Environment. A Report for Congress. FEMA 409. Washington, D.C.: Federal Emergency 
 Management Agency, 2002. 
13 
 
appropriate steps to reduce risk and damage.”28 
Public Education: Key Challenges for the Floodplain Management Community 
 Even as the floodplain management community advances calls for improved 
public education about flooding, it remains challenged by how to do so. It is not alone in 
this challenge, however. As Mileti and his colleagues note, “There has been a dearth of 
experience-driven policy shaping the design of public education campaigns about 
hazards, and substantial underuse of theory from the social and behavior sciences to 
inform such efforts.”29 Adding to this problem, unlike the earthquake sector of the natural 
hazards community, which has based its education programs on social science research, 
the floodplain management community has not formed an effective national collaboration 
designed to educate the public about flooding.  It also has not yet created a consistent 
public message about preparedness.  As my review of flood education materials shows 
below, doing so will be critical to improving public understanding about flood risk, not 
least because past efforts have been ineffective. 
 The majority of previous flood education efforts focus on raising awareness 
among the public about their level of “flood risk,” defined usually as the recurrence 
interval of flood events of a certain magnitude, such as the 100-year-flood, the 500-year 
flood, etc.
30
  While most natural disasters are ranked by their size or impact, such as 
through the Saffir-Simpson scale for hurricanes, floods are measured by the likelihood of 
their recurrence. These recurrence intervals are measured in dramatically long time-spans 
that lead people to perceive only occasional flood risk; e.g., “it only happens once every 
                                                 
28
 Association of State Floodplain Managers, “National Flood Programs and Policies in Review 
 2007,” (Madison, WI: ASFPM Foundation, 2007). 
29
  Wood, et al. 2011, p. 2. 
30
 United States Geological Survey, “Floods: Recurrence Intervals and 100-year floods.” 
 http://ga.water.usgs.gov/edu/100yearflood.html (accessed August 3, 2012).  
14 
 
100 years.”  The truth, however, is quite different, with the average 30-year mortgage 
holder having a 25% likelihood of experiencing a flood during that payment period.
31
  
The failure of this recurrence interval approach to motivate public preparedness is now 
widely understood – and widely bemoaned - among floodplain managers, who are 
saddled with regulatory language that was designed for use in determining insurance 
coverage areas. 
 Currently the 100-year-flood remains the predominant terminology in flood risk 
communication messages, and the persistence of this language is not a small matter and 
not merely a choice of words.  The regulatory definition of the 100-year flood (including 
under its new name, preferred by many, the “1% annual chance flood”) is insufficient for 
successfully communicating about flood risk not merely because it creates confusion in 
the public mind about the likelihood of a major flood; this argument has been well-made 
by others.
32
 More importantly, this “flood risk” approach also misses a major distinction 
between flooding and other hazards that must be considered when shaping flood 
education messages. While many natural hazards may be inevitable, flooding is also a 
natural and beneficial function of water and land systems; indeed, flooding should be 
anticipated, and some may argue welcomed, as a regular part of river variability.  
Understanding flood “risk” in the context of these ecological benefits means communities 
must focus on preparing for the inevitability of flooding rather than attempting to expand 
the intervals between floods. I will revisit this point below because it bears on how risk is 
defined, but at present my point is that the risk-and-probability approach to flood 
                                                 
31
  Federal Emergency Management Agency, “Definitions of FEMA Flood Zone Designations,” 
 https://msc.fema.gov/webapp/wcs/stores/servlet/info?storeId=10001&catalogId=10001&langId=-
 1&content=floodZones&title=FEMA%2520Flood%2520Zone%2520Designations/ (accessed 
 August 3, 2012. 
32
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education fails to convey the actual costs and benefits of flooding, and may in fact deter 
preparedness. 
The current approach to flood education also fails to incorporate an accurate 
understanding about what motivates individuals to take action toward preparedness.  As 
will be described below, an array of sociological theories about human perception of risk 
and loss – such as the optimistic bias, loss aversion and availability heuristics – can 
predict the failure of these past risk-and-probability approaches to education about risk.   
Drawing on these findings, actionable risk theory proposes instead a “substantial 
departure” from this standard approach to risk communication and instead calls for 
stressing communication about actions rather than risks to motivate preparedness.
33
 
 Recently, perhaps in response to actionable risk theory or other advances in 
understanding human judgment and decision-making, some governmental efforts have 
tried to build action-oriented flood education messages into their operations. National 
Weather Service (NWS) in particular has long made explicit flood warnings that include 
directions for how to prepare property, avoid driving in floodwaters, and evacuate to safe 
ground. FEMA additionally prepares publications covering various aspects of flooding 
and flood preparedness, including the need to purchase flood insurance and create an 
emergency kit, for instance. FEMA has recently revamped its Ready.gov website to 
emphasize preparedness actions more prominently. As I will discuss in the analysis 
below, although these actions represent very small steps forward in efforts to promote 
public preparedness, they do little to advance what I contend is a critical component of 
public preparedness: building a community identity around risk. 
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PART III. Developing a Theoretical Framework for Flood Risk Preparedness 
 Although social science-informed flood education campaigns have been relatively 
few compared to the extent of the problem, research about how sociological and 
psychological processes affect an individual's understanding of the risk of a particular 
threat is extensive. The Natural Hazards Research Center has prepared the Public 
Hazards Communication Bibliography, which summarizes more than 350 articles 
concerning the communication of public hazards (including natural and technical) to the 
public.
34
 A review of this collection, as well as other studies, reveals important trends in 
people’s motivation for preparedness and in people’s response to public warnings, 
including flood warnings. Beyond the physical barriers of proximate and linguistic access 
to the forecast tools and warning messages,
35
 this research identifies various social and 
psychological reasons that prevent people from taking preparedness actions including 
their past experience with the risk,
36
 the effect of uncertainty on decision-making,
37
 the 
credibility of or personal connection to the source of warning,
38
 and learning styles.
39
 
 Most important for present purposes, many studies identify a strong link between 
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being part of social networks and the likelihood of taking of preparedness actions. 
Specifically, the more involvement one has in a social network, the more likely one is to 
receive and heed a hazard warning.
40
 Some link better preparedness outcomes to common 
and prevailing beliefs about preparedness within a community. For instance, one study of 
preparedness behaviors in a heavily flooded Australian community found the community 
to be “staunchly resilient” despite repetitive flooding and poor physical circumstances 
relative to flooding. Researchers cited the community's “well-developed and functional 
social and institutional networks” and the belief of residents that “they have a personal 
responsibility for preparation and personal mitigation activities” as reasons for this 
resiliency.
41
 Place attachment can also affect flood preparedness. Mishra, et al., define 
place attachment as an “emotional bond between individuals, groups, or communities and 
their physical environments,” and they find that those with such attachments are more 
likely than others to prepare for floods in India.
42
 These findings – concerning networks 
and place -- make sense, intuitively. If someone is connected to an area, and has strong 
information portals and relationships to preserve, she will be more likely to receive 
information and use it to take care of her physical place within the community. 
The important role played by social and community context is also affirmed by 
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studies showing that concern for community well-being during flood events may 
motivate preparedness more effectively than regard for one's own welfare. Kim and Kang 
undertook a study of hurricane preparedness in Tuscaloosa, Alabama during Hurricane 
Ivan to examine how factors such as neighborhood belonging affected hurricane 
preparedness. For the study, the researchers created measures of “personal risk 
perception” (perceived risk to one's life or personal property, measured through 
statements such as “I thought my house would lose power or water” or “I thought my 
family would get hurt.”) and “social risk perception” (perceived risk to someone else's 
life or property, measured through statements such as “I thought other people in 
Tuscaloosa would lose power or water” or “I thought other people in Tuscaloosa might 
have to move to a shelter.”).43 Their findings suggest that, when planning for a future 
hurricane event, one's sense of risk to other people's properties and belongings is more 
effective than a personal risk perception in motivating preparedness.  This means that 
people who recognize a community-level threat might be more likely to meet or talk with 
others about the event and to begin getting ready for evacuation, than those who are 
focused primarily on their own risk, the perception of which is more easily diminished 
when not reinforced by social networks. Interestingly, the study also found that once a 
hurricane is underway, people are more motivated by their own personal risk perception, 
rather than social risk perception. The emphasis, therefore, should be on building 
community-level risk perception in advance of the events, to motivate better 
preparedness before the hurricane hits. The authors advise that messages for future 
hurricane events advise people that “you have to do something for others and your 
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community.” In other words, one should construct pre-hurricane preparedness messages 
that focus on community-level damage: “It seems that when a natural disaster is still a 
future event, individuals’ concern about community (as responsible citizens) is a stronger 
factor in taking preparedness steps than perception of one’s own risks.”44 They further 
call for building a “community-level communications network” that can connect 
residents to “storytellers” (media, neighbors, organizations) who can share information. 
 Sociological research also explains the ways in which errors in risk perception and 
judgment can negatively affect how individuals prepare for hazards and respond to 
warnings. I have already discussed why people's judgment is negatively affected by the 
poorly chosen “100-year-flood” terminology. Extensive research on behavior phenomena 
such as loss aversion (the tendency for an individual to be more concerned with losses 
than pleased with gains),
45
 the optimistic bias (the tendency to perceive a risk as a greater 
threat to others than to oneself),
46
 and the availability heuristic (the tendency to call upon 
events in one's memory to decide the probability of an event)
47
 demonstrates that 
individuals regularly miscalculate their own risk, and make apparently “poor” risk 
decisions as a result.
48
 Collectively, these factors elucidate the complexities of 
communicating about risk vulnerability to public audiences. But as Slovic notes, lay 
perceptions about risk, while failing in certain understandings, can inform researchers 
about how more effectively to assess and communicate risk. He argues that in order to 
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successfully communicate and manage risks, communities must have an open exchange 
between professional and lay audiences. “Each side, expert and public, has something 
valid to contribute. Each side must respect the insights and intelligence of the other.”49  
Despite significant advances in expert-lay communication, as well as the previously 
discussed research on the role of networks, place, and community in shaping 
preparedness action, the field of flood education has failed to produce a framework upon 
which to build coherent and successful flood education programming in the United 
States. 
Communicating Actionable Risk: A New Approach for Hazards Education 
 In a paper entitled “Communicating Actionable Risk for Terrorism and Other 
Hazards,” Michele M. Wood, Dennis Mileti and others offer a new theoretical model for 
motivating hazard preparedness for terrorism and other “high consequence, low-
probability events.”  This model builds on and adds significant understandings to Mileti's 
seminal 1999 book Disasters by Design, which largely set the agenda for disaster 
preparedness and management in the natural hazards field over the past two decades.  
This recent research asserts that hazard education in the past has operated on the 
“hunches and intuitions” of the program designers rather than on any social science 
evidence about what gets people to act. As they explain, “Although it feels good, our 
intuition about how to motivate behavior change often misses the mark.”50 Thus, rather 
than rely on intuitions, actionable risk communication stresses that programs and policies 
need to focus on describing and demonstrating preparedness actions that can and should 
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be taken. This “actionable risk communication theory” or “actionable risk theory” has 
key findings that the authors suggest are transferable to a broad range of hazards, which I 
will now discuss and apply in the flooding context. 
Diffusion of Innovations and Communications Theories 
 Actionable risk theory is based on social science research constructing what is 
referred to as theories of “communications” and “diffusion of innovations.” These 
theories address issues related to how information is transferred in social structures and 
networks. The diffusion of innovations theory was popularized by rural sociologist 
Everett Rogers in 1962, in his groundbreaking book Diffusion of Innovations. Rogers 
proposes that individuals adopt new practices through a 5-step process that includes 
periods of (acquiring) knowledge, (seeking) persuasion, (weighing) decision, (choosing) 
implementation, and finally, (pursuing) confirmation that the new practice is one they 
will adopt and continue.
51
 Critical to this theory is that innovation is adopted over a 
period of time through communication channels and as part of a social system “engaged 
in joint problem solving to accomplish a common goal.”52 Rogers defines innovation as 
“an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new by an individual or another unit of 
adoption.”53 After his book publication, research on diffusion of innovations quickly 
spread to include a variety of fields, such as marketing, public health and medical 
sociology, general sociology, and communication research.
54 
Communication theory also 
looks at channels of communication that operate within social systems, asking more 
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generally, “Who says what in which channel to whom and with what effect?”55  Both 
theories assume the importance of a community-level perspective in understanding and 
shaping people’s behavior and both conceive of individuals as actors embedded in social 
networks that can influence their behaviors. 
Testing the Model 
 Drawing on these theories along with findings from empirical research, Mileti and 
his colleagues identify seven constructs relevant to a model for “predicting household 
preparedness actions as a result of public education campaigns.”56 These constructs, and 
the findings about them, form the basis for what I will refer to as “best practices” for 
motivating preparedness. The seven constructs are: 
1. Content of Preparedness Information Received 
2. Density of Preparedness Information Received 
3. Consistency of Information Received 
4. Preparedness Action Information Observed 
5. Knowledge of Preparedness Actions 
6. Perceived Effectiveness of Preparedness Actions 
7. Milling About Preparedness Actions 
 
To test the assumptions about the relevance of these constructs, and about their proposed 
theoretical model for motivating preparedness, Mileti’s group sampled approximately 
2,800 individuals in the United States, who were stratified according to low and high 
“terrorism visibility areas.”57  Respondents answered questions about the content of 
information they had received, observed or taken related to specific actions, including the 
following: development of emergency plans (evacuation, meeting places, etc.); 
stockpiling of supplies (food water, antibiotics, etc.); the purchase of things to make one's 
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house safer; and duplication of important documents (birth certificate, medical 
prescriptions, and passports). They were also questioned about their knowledge, their 
perceived effectiveness of preparedness actions, and the density of information they 
received – i.e., whether the individuals had heard information about terrorism from 
newspapers, TV anchors or reporters, radio hosts, friends, relatives, employers, or the 
Department of Homeland Security. Finally, respondents were questioned about their 
milling behaviors, or whether they have “actively looked for information about preparing 
for a future terrorist act.”58 
 The findings resulting from this research reveal a great deal about what works to 
motivate the public through hazard education campaigns. The primary finding relates to 
the power of milling, which I describe below after discussing how the remainder of the 
findings can form the basis for best practices for flood education. 
Best Practices:  The New Rules for Flood Education 
 With the exception of “information consistency,” all the constructs tested in the 
actionable risk communication theory were found effective for motivating individuals to 
prepare for hazards. These constructs, re-phrased and re-conceived as educational 
objectives, can help guide and inform flood education campaigns, policies and programs.  
In the table below, I characterize each specific research finding and then the three best 
practices that emerge, with examples for how they might be applied to flood education. 
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Table 3.0  Best Practices for Motivating Preparedness for Hazards 
Construct and Related Findings Best Practices Examples 
“Effects of Preparedness Information 
Observed” was the “single strongest 
predictor of all in motivating 
household preparedness in America.”  
It directly influenced actions taken, as 
well as the perceived effectiveness of 
taking preparedness actions. 
Demonstrate Preparedness 
Behaviors. 
 
 
Education campaigns should 
visually show the desired 
prepared actions being taken; 
e.g. show families packing an 
emergency kit, elevating 
properties, moving important 
items to the upper levels of 
the floors, checking flood 
alerts on cell phones and 
websites. 
“Content of Preparedness Information 
Received” influenced household 
knowledge and action taken related to 
preparedness. 
Provide Information About 
Actions to Take to Prevent 
Future Losses. 
 
 
Education efforts should 
focus on actions to take to 
reduce losses, rather than 
focusing on the disaster or 
risk (probability) itself; e.g. 
FEMA and other agencies’ 
brochures, websites and 
relevant materials should 
disseminate information 
about building flood kits, 
purchasing flood insurance, 
and signing up for weather 
alerts. These materials should 
also explain that doing so will 
reduce losses in the future. 
“Density of Preparedness Information 
Received” influenced knowledge and 
action related to preparedness 
Repeat messages multiple 
times, from multiple sources, 
through multiple channels of 
communication. 
Federal and local agencies 
should unite to co-brand 
flood messages on TV, radio 
and internet, for an extended 
campaign. 
 
Among these best practices, demonstrating preparedness behaviors is particularly 
important for educators to consider.  This practice requires people to reconsider the 
practice of crafting graphic images of the damages that hazards can produce, in order to 
scare people into preparing. Specifically, the actionable risk communication model does 
not hold that fear works to motivate preparedness – indeed, quite the opposite is true.  
What motivates people is seeing others take the preparedness actions that they should 
25 
 
take.  Showing repeated images of cars turning away from flooded roads, then, is 
preferable to showing cars underwater.  The message, in short, is to make available to 
people's minds images of the actions they should take, and not the ones they should 
avoid.   
 Giving information of a certain kind is also important: receiving preparedness 
information helps motivate preparedness, but actionable risk communication theory finds 
this information is most effective if it focuses on the actions one should take to prepare.  
The message is to focus on preparing in order to avoid flood losses.  For example, if one 
wants to motivate a property owner to take preparedness actions, one should tell the 
floodplain resident that in order to reduce losses, he or she needs to turn off utilities or 
make an emergency preparedness kit. One should not attempt to motivate preparedness 
by explaining that a property owner has a 1% annual chance of a major flood on her 
property. While this distinction might seem sensible stated so plainly, the latter approach 
has been more common among flood education policies and programs to date. Lastly, the 
model supports that providing dense information – that is, information that is repeated by 
multiple channels over time – is another critical part of successful messaging. Far from 
making people “tune out,” actionable risk communication theory states that “repetition is 
essentially the only way to help people “tune in.”59  Though the particular research 
discussed above did not statistically support that the consistency of information received 
had an effect on preparedness, previous research does, and the authors leave the issue on 
the table as a consideration for those interested in motivating preparedness.
60
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Why Milling Works 
 The research of Mileti and his team on terrorism preparedness also demonstrates a 
key role that milling can play in flood education programs. Milling, as defined in 
actionable risk communication theory, is the act of “engaging in searching behavior... and 
interacting with others to affirm the appropriateness of preparedness actions.”61 Put more 
simply, to mill is to seek out information, and then reflect upon it with neighbors, friends 
and families. Actionable risk communication theory suggests that these practices of 
seeking out, reflecting on, and sharing information should be the key element in effective 
hazard education campaigns: 
“The strongest motivator of taking preparedness actions is when people share 
what they have done to prepare with other individuals who have not done much.  
Thus, the most powerful preparedness spokespersons are not government agencies 
or non-government organizations, but instead members of the public who have 
already prepared.”62 
 
The explanations for why milling is so effective interestingly point toward issues of 
social influence, and of perceived personal power. By definition, milling precedes the 
taking of action for preparedness. And much social science research supports that taking 
action is preceded by searching out information and considering it with others.
63
 As 
Wood, et al propose, “Perhaps this is because information seeking allows people to have 
a sense of control of their own response to risk communications and to perceive their 
actions as self-driven.”64 In previous work, Mileti has referred to this in discussing the 
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importance of “people believing it was their own idea to prepare.”65 Another suggestion 
states that observing others taking actions leads “observers to think the actions they are 
observing are effective because others have performed them.”66 In his presentation to a 
group of floodplain managers in October 2009 in Washington, D.C., Mileti described 
milling as everyday decision-making with consultation from friends and peers. He 
offered the theoretical example of a man shopping for a new red sports car. He would not 
simply buy the car, but first would poll his friends: “Would I look sexy in that car, do you 
think?”  Mileti proposed the man might ask.67 
 While these examples highlight the centrality of social influence to the actionable 
risk communication model, Rogers offers yet another consideration. As he describes it, an 
innovation presents an “individual or an organization with a new alternative or 
alternatives, with new means of solving problems.”68 But this new alternative also 
involves uncertainty.  And “uncertainty implies a lack of predictability of the future. It 
motivates an individual to seek information.” 69 The same scenario applies to 
preparedness for hazards: the uncertainty of risk can motivate information-seeking, but 
not always in the way that program designers expect. National Weather Service, for 
instance, conducted a service assessment after the Joplin, MO tornado in 2011.
70
 From 
this assessment they confirmed that upon hearing about a tornado warning people did not 
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follow the warning directions, but rather took secondary actions to confirm the warning 
was correct – by calling 9-1-1 or a relative down the street to see if anyone had in fact 
seen the tornado. It was only after the information was confirmed with peers that the 
caller decided to prepare. Milling, it appears, influenced the perceived effectiveness of 
taking actions, and motivated preparedness steps. “Official” messages alone did not.  
 Based on similar findings, Wood, et al. conclude that the target for hazard 
campaigns may not be the unprepared, but rather the prepared: “(P)reparedness programs 
need to expand their current practice and entice such individuals to share what they have 
done with others” (emphasis added).71 
 Richard Thaler, writing with Cass Sunstein in the recent book, Nudge, reached 
similar conclusions about how “choice architects,” or those who frame the conditions 
under which people make decisions, might influence behavior. “If choice architects want 
to shift behavior and to do so with a nudge, they might simply inform people about what 
other people are doing.”72 The authors take the notion of social pressure further, to 
explain how strongly social influence can shape behaviors of all kinds. They review a 
body of research that supports a simple take-away message: people will do what they 
believe others are doing, whether that is paying their taxes or scooping up dog waste. 
Sunstein and Thaler suggest that phrases such as “most people prefer,” “most people are 
turning to,” and “growing numbers of people” are highly effective for motivating specific 
choices among undecided individuals.
73
 They theorize that social influence works in two 
ways. The first is information transfer, as proposed in the milling philosophy. Individuals 
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hand off knowledge and information – right or wrong – to one another. Kuran and 
Sunstein have noted elsewhere how this transfer of information can trigger “availability 
cascades” that can influence behavior as “collective beliefs” about information begin to 
grow and compound as each new person reinforces the information.
74
 For flood 
education, such an understanding underlies the importance of spreading the “right” 
information about preparedness actions. The second mechanism of social influence 
Thaler and Sunstein discuss moves us closer to an understanding of community identity, 
and this is the power of peer pressure, or of “doing what others do.” 75 Those who want 
the approval of others, will copy them. If this is so, it raises important questions about 
identity and belonging that pertain to preparing for hazards. Specifically, could the 
influence of community identity and belonging also motivate preparedness behaviors? If 
doing what others do is a factor in decision-making, then is there a role for being a part of 
what others are?   
Building a Community Identity Around Risk 
 The actionable risk communication research discussed above was tested in the 
context of terrorism, but based on theoretical findings from experiments concerning a 
wide range of hazards. The research suggests that the findings can be transferred to 
understanding about motivating preparedness for other “high-consequence low 
probability” events. Flooding is such an event. As a risk topic, however, flooding can be 
distinguished from other “high-consequence low probability” events because flooding is 
not anomalous to a normal occurrence. The probability of flooding in any given region 
can be higher or lower, but generally, flooding is a natural and beneficial function of river 
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ecosystems. Far from falling into definitions of risk as something that “may or may not 
occur,” flooding is a certain and essential part of river life; only the timing, location and 
magnitude of flooding at any given time is in question.
76
 As such, the conclusions of risk 
communication research, and specifically those of natural hazards research, must be 
applied with care to the cause of flooding.    
 Addressing education about a natural and important event like flooding might 
logically look very different than a campaign about terrorism or some public health issues 
that are rare and detrimental, such as traffic accidents. Those events are ones that are 
uniformly negative in character, and that most would agree should be prevented at all 
times. Flooding, however, cannot be stopped in the traditional sense (despite the history 
of efforts to do so; see Part II.).  Rather, if flooding is to be understood properly, the 
objective of flood education must be to normalize the hazard in everyday life, and 
motivate individuals to take the proper adaptive steps to reduce losses. Thus, instead of 
responding to floods as “fluke events” or as “beyond imagination,” as they are regularly 
described in media reports, residents should come to understand that floods are an 
integral and unavoidable part of the landscape in which they live.
77
 In fact, floods created 
and continue to maintain the landscape in which they live. This is in contrast to 
earthquakes, which represent a one-way response to plate motions. Floods, on the other 
hand, create and maintain the floodplain through millennia of sediment deposition and 
reworking. 
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 I propose that naturalizing the relationship between community members and 
their flood-prone landscape can be achieved by flood education programs that work to 
build or create a “community identity around risk.” In such a relationship, the 
boundaries between the hazard and the “victim” are softened, and instead a more 
cooperative relationship is built -- one in which community members understand 
themselves as part of a larger system of people and lands (i.e., floodplains) that together 
make way for the river's occasional high rises. In this context floods are not conceived of 
as devastating anomalies affecting unsuspecting communities, but rather they are episodic 
natural events for which the community has prepared a series of evacuation and 
preparedness plans to accommodate. Floods, in this approach, become a part of the 
culture of the community in which they occur, and preparedness becomes the normative 
response. Communities draw strength from their collective understanding of risk (“we 
know how to handle this”), and motivation to prepare from their sense of belonging (“we 
prepare together, for everyone's sake”). 
 The importance of building a community identity around risk is evidenced by 
literature on disaster cultures, which concerns the cultural response to disasters. Harry E. 
Moore early on connected community identity to disasters in 1964 with the notion of a 
“disaster culture,” through which communities develop a set of “cultural defenses” in 
response to the history or future threat of a disaster.
78
 How and whether communities 
respond normatively to the presence of disasters has also been studied by researchers at 
the University of Delaware's Disaster Research Center, who refer to “disaster 
subcultures.” When a community has experienced a disaster, such as a flood, and 
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continues to carry the “residues” of that experience, a “disaster subculture” is formed.79 
As explained by Wenger and Weller, the contours of this disaster subculture can vary 
widely from community to community, and are defined by a series of dialectic 
relationships that determine how that subculture manifests, or doesn't. The first of these is 
the latent or manifest dialectic, which refers to the degree to which the disaster subculture 
penetrates everyday life (manifest) or only emerges as a new disaster approaches (latent).  
Disaster subcultures also vary in the extent to which the culture is embodied in the 
individuals in the community, or the organizations that respond to the disasters.  Further, 
the subcultures can either respond in instrumental ways – through technology and actions 
in response to disaster control – or through expressive ways, such as the “norms, values, 
beliefs, legends and myths about disaster.”80   
 A community's subculture can also be understood in terms of its scope – whether 
the subculture exists only in the affected areas, such as the floodplains, or throughout the 
larger geographic community.  As examples, Wenger and Weller describe the highly 
manifest and individualistic expression of disaster subculture in Marietta, Ohio, a town 
that openly acknowledges and embraces its “flood town” status, and that coaches 
newcomers about the appropriate normative responses to flooding. Here, the scope is 
broad: the entire community, organizationally and individually, identifies flooding as part 
of community life. This approach stands in contrast to Cincinnatti, Ohio, which Wenger 
and Weller find to be largely latent and organizational in its disaster subculture. In 
Cincinnatti, highly developed flood control plans exist under the control of official 
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agencies who implement them at the time of disasters. In Marietta, residents retain much 
of the knowledge of flood crests and mitigation approaches, along with the key 
institutional groups, who are also organized in response. In charting the development of 
disaster subcultures, Wenger and Weller identify a few key factors that predict whether 
the disaster will be salient enough to form an enduring subculture.  Specifically, they 
conclude that: 
“...one can expect a subculture to develop within a community that has 
experienced repetitive impacts from a disaster agent that allows a period of 
forewarning, results in diffuse damage that cuts across class and status lines in the 
community, produces consequential damage to the human and material resources 
of the community, and is perceived as posing a continuing threat.”81 
 
Flooding most certainly can be defined as such a disaster.  In describing these 
characteristics, Wenger and Weller caution that disaster subcultures can produce negative 
consequences, as well as adaptation during and in the wake of disaster events.  If, for 
instance, a community has collectively identified as a “flood city” it may be less prepared 
when another, different disaster strikes; it may have focused its disaster preparedness too 
narrowly. Or, the legends about the disaster may understate future conditions, leading 
people to believe that they have experienced the worst possible scenario.
82
 However, a 
defining and concluding statement in the study suggests the potential of such a “disaster 
subculture” to help motivate preparedness through social networks: “The true indication 
of the existence of a disaster subculture can be found in the perpetuation of successful 
patterns of adaptation to disaster contexts by the process of socialization.”83 
Social Networks and Movements as the Basis for Collective Action 
 How disaster cultures or subcultures form in response to the history or threat of 
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disasters demonstrates the important role that social networks and movements can play in 
building a community identity around risk. From an educator’s perspective, building a 
community identity around risk in order to encourage people to prepare collectively can 
happen intentionally, rather than in an accidental or haphazard way. Such an identity can 
be developed through flood education programs and messages, and conceived in 
conjunction with the best practices and milling approaches discussed above. Indeed, 
because of its community-level perspective, actionable risk communication theory is a 
perfect companion to the community identity approach. Specifically, what is required for 
building a community identity around risk is more explicit consideration of community 
networks, and of how people’s belief in a shared identity can further motivate 
preparedness behaviors. 
Social networks and social movements, which have been shown effective 
mechanisms for spreading beliefs and behaviors, are helpful here. Social networks are, at 
essence, the social structures that link individuals to one another. They can be understood 
as an “organized set of people that consists of two kinds of elements: human beings and 
the connections between them.”84 Networks, most basically, connect individual actors 
through dyads, or pairs of people, and expand out infinitely from there. In describing how 
the positive effects of actions such as organ donation can ripple through a community, 
Christakis and Fowler explain that “social networks spread happiness, generosity, and 
love.”85 
Pertinent to flood risk interests, other research demonstrates how these networks 
can also spread knowledge of risks effectively.  Rickard found that commercial pesticide 
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applicators served as “informal risk communicators” to clients, to whom they offered not 
only technical services (spraying of chemicals) but also care and concern (through the 
sharing of information about the risks of the chemicals, and the failure to use them).
86
 As 
noted earlier, multiple hazards studies suggest that involvement in social networks 
improves the likelihood that a person will receive, and importantly, believe a warning 
message.
87
 Burkhart's 1991 study of how different channels of information affect 
community response to a hazard found that social networks (along with media) were a 
primary source of preparedness information.
88
 The community identity approach to 
preparedness that I am proposing therefore incorporates social networks as a mechanism 
for spreading preparedness behaviors within a community. 
 Beyond the simple transfer of knowledge between individuals, research about 
networks shows that social networks can also mobilize participation in group efforts.  
Klandermans and Oegema found that informal networks, primarily friendship ties, were 
more effective at recruiting participation in a Dutch peace movement than were formal 
networks, such as recruiting by organizations or direct mail pieces.
89
 Further, which 
group someone identifies with can influence the types of behaviors he will select to take.  
Christakis and Fowler, for instance, explain how one's sense of belonging shaped the type 
of strategies undertaken by political activists. Whether the activists were linked to formal 
government networks or worked outside official channels changed whether they sought 
change from within the system (through lobbying), or without (through civil 
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disobedience). “So people who think of themselves as Democrats might join the Sierra 
Club, but they are very unlikely to join less established groups such as the Yippies that 
might be pursuing the same goal with different methods.”90 In this case, social identity -- 
a belief in who one was -- determined how individuals spent their political energy. For 
the case of flooding, these studies suggest a need to rely on social networks and 
community to mobilize a group effort at preparedness, and further, that helping people to 
self-identify as part of a “prepared community” can be critical for motivating them to 
direct their energy toward preparedness. 
 The role of networks in motivating group participation is also important because 
the group can create a sense of belonging and collective capacity to resist shared 
challenges. For instance, as Pardo found in a study of low-income female Mexican 
American political activists, group identity can launch political activism where there was 
none previously. Disempowered mothers facing immediate threats to the safety of their 
families and neighborhoods were able to transform their social networks into the basis for 
strong political activism. By drawing on the strength of their “traditional” or “informal” 
connections and developing a collective identity as Mexican Americans and mothers, the 
“Mothers of East Los Angeles” overcame traditional barriers to political participation 
(their role as women, and their lack of political efficacy). Against all theoretical and 
actual odds, this group became a powerful political group, and tackled a variety of threats 
to their urban community.
91
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 In a flooding context, a similar effect can take place when communities use 
networks and a sense of responsibility to the community to motivate preparedness.  
Revisiting the research in Australia mentioned earlier, recall that researchers attributed 
the heavily flood-prone community's resilience to community networks and beliefs. 
There, residents are found to have “high levels of sense of belonging in the community 
and participation in community activities,” and also to “believe they, as well as Local 
Council, are responsible for preparing for floods.”92 Despite tremendous flooding and 
poor physical surroundings, residents remain, and community businesses opt not to 
relocate for the convenience of customers. 
 In both these previous studies, a collective sense of strength, belonging and 
responsibility motivated collective action in the face of a threat. A 2006 U.K. study of 
how women view the causes of breast cancer showed that shifting the emphasis from 
individual to collective risk more effectively motivated women to seek out ways to get 
involved in reducing environmental causes of breast cancer. In this case, focus groups of 
both breast cancer survivors and those without the disease were asked to map their 
narrative understandings of suspected environmental hazards in their neighborhoods – at 
the local factories, mines, workplaces. The researchers found that during the course of the 
mapping, the understanding of the participants shifted from an individual focus on the 
causes of risk, such as diet, exercise and genetics, to a communal identity of risk factors 
for breast cancer. Researchers describe that as a result the group of women began to 
identify not as individual victims, but as a collective citizenry with a shared concern 
about breast cancer risk. From this position, the women began to seek out ways to get 
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involved in larger collectives looking at environmental causes of breast cancer.
93
 Alone, 
the women could work only to address their own risk. As a group, they were empowered 
to seek out answers that could benefit not only themselves, but also their community of 
at-risk women. 
 Taken together, these examples demonstrate that a sense of identity and belonging 
within a group can alter or create patterns of action. Social influence, Sunstein argues, 
works through information transfer and “peer pressure.” Community identity, as various 
studies suggest, works further by tapping into a sense of how one is supposed to behave 
because of who one is within that peer group. As Sunstein notes, arguing that “most 
people do” a particular behavior can persuade another to take that action. In the case of 
preparedness, where the decision to engage requires a long-term commitment to a 
lifestyle and mindset, stronger motivation can be found by noting that “people with 
whom I connect and choose to relate” do this or that behavior.  Rather than mere herd 
behavior directing one to do simply what another does, having a community identity 
around risk taps into one’s self-identity and connection to who those other people are. It 
engenders a sense of responsibility to the others in a community that one has intentionally 
entered. The assumption is not merely that people will prepare because they are asked to, 
but because they understand that being prepared is what their community does.   
 In the context of flooding, communities can form an identity around the risk that 
bonds them as members of a collective who know and understand the capacities of the 
river. Their identity, whether as “river folk” or a “flood city” can include a strong 
understanding of river variability, and a pride in their ability to accommodate the river's 
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rise and fall. Together, the group would understand both how – through information 
transfer - and why – through community action - to prepare in advance against the shared 
threat of losses to life and property from flooding. 
 Community response to risk can take other forms than I propose, and it generally 
does.  As Wenger and Weller describe, the natural response of communities to disaster 
can form a disaster subculture, but such a subculture, if not cultivated correctly, can 
create its own problems (too narrow a definition of risk or an assumption that the 
community knows the worst risks that can occur). Most frequently, communities respond 
to risk by assigning responsibility for mitigation and loss control to professionals, 
including municipal officials or emergency managers, and government agencies. In this 
model, the emphasis on flood loss reduction centers often around structural projects.  
Residents are given the job of waiting for flood warnings, but are provided with little 
direction about what to do when that warning is issued. Individual preparedness is 
therefore given scant attention.  As noted by Mileti, relying too heavily on institutional 
and governmental responses has its own threats. When governments appear very pro-
active in addressing hazard issues, “individuals may be lulled into a false sense of 
security and become less prepared to cope with or respond to a disaster event because 
organizational adaptations to the threat appear to be sufficient."
94
 Recently, Sayre 
provided an interesting description of another response in Tokyo, where tremendous 
preparedness exists but is “concealed” from daily life. Here, preparedness is tucked into 
everyday life – umbrellas at the bottom of handbags, pop-up coffins built into the walls of 
school gymnasiums – in an out-of-sight sort of style, intentionally kept out of mind but 
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ready as needed. 
 In contrast, building community identity around risk is an explicit process of 
intentional action, rather than concealed intentions. When educators and others build such 
an identity they will make it plain to all that motivating preparedness within the 
community is their goal. Recalling Wenger and Weller's dialectic relationships, when 
people share a community identity around risk it is manifest all the time, and not waiting 
to emerge only in times of crisis. As an approach to preparedness, it is also broad in 
scope, and inclusive of the entire community. It depends upon individual as well as 
institutional planned responses to the risk, and lastly, includes both instrumental as well 
as expressive understandings of risk. Indeed, it is the inclusion of expressive responses – 
norms, values and beliefs about who a community is in relationship to their risk – that 
helps to create the community identity around risk. 
Consider, then, what this might entail in the context of communities at risk for 
flooding. In such a context, having a community identity that is grounded in flood-related 
risk requires 1) that individuals understand river variability as a natural process of the 
river, and 2) that this variability requires the joint attention and preparation of the 
individual with his or her neighbors, in order to reduce loss for all of them. The end goal 
is a community that organizes its collective life and practices around the presence of the 
risk, in order to reduce loss of life and property, and damage to the physical environment. 
 As a matter of flood education, creating a community identity around risk is not 
an accidental process, but rather requires an intentional effort to infuse educational 
messages with proper content (as drawn from the best practices of actionable risk theory) 
about flooding preparedness. It also requires that messages encourage the sharing and 
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discussion of this content and these action steps with peers and neighbors (i.e., milling).  
Lastly, it requires messages that identify the recipient of the message as connected to a 
larger community of people who are prepared for flooding. With this in mind, in Part IV 
of this paper, I examine how the earthquake preparedness sector of the natural hazards 
community has already begun to build such a community identity around risk, and I 
compare these efforts to those of the floodplain management community. However, 
before doing so, it will be important to understand with more specificity what is meant by 
the terms “community” and “identity.” 
Understanding Community and Identity 
 Assumed in the milling philosophy is that individuals have neighborly and family 
or peer relationships upon which they can draw in their decision-making process. The 
concept of a decline in community, popularized again recently by Robert Putnam's book 
Bowling Alone, is not new, and suggests generally that advances in transportation and 
other technology have created a more mobile, and therefore more geographically and 
relationally disconnected society.
95
 Despite this premise, there is evidence to suggest that 
neighborly connections do still operate in the United States. For instance, a survey by the 
insurance agency State Farm about the role of neighbors, for instance, found that 71 
percent of neighbors “chat with neighbors face-to-face at least once a month,” and 12 
percent stay in touch via social media. The survey also found that neighbors still actively 
interact, share childcare, lend tools and financial resources, and rely on each other's 
presence to improve happiness.
96
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 In a departure from the unstated assumptions of what “community” means in the 
disaster culture and disaster subculture theories,  I allow for a broader and more inclusive 
description of community than merely the municipal or geographic boundaries 
surrounding floodplain areas. Specifically, I avoid the discussion of whether community 
must be this traditional neighborly community, conceived of in the sense of “corporate 
groups producing communal ties.”97 Instead, I adopt a more expanded sense of 
community, a “community without propinquity” which allows for extra-local 
relationships carried out by choice with “modern means of communication and 
transportation.”98 This conception of community permits both types of community to   
influence an individual's motivation to act. Given the very local nature of the flooding 
phenomenon, it is reasonable to expect that one's local, geographic boundaries will be a 
particularly salient factor in defining the community that shares an identity around risk.  
Previous disaster culture studies have assumed this to be so. But, if we follow Fischer in 
accepting that “new sources of personal networks are supplementing traditional ones,” 
and that the “closed corporate groups of the past are waning,” then we must also consider 
this community identity in broader contexts.
99
 
 For the purpose of this paper, whether an individual views themselves as part of a 
municipal community, for instance, or a statewide one, or a national one, or even a 
demographic one of a particular type, is not the key distinction. Indeed it may be 
incumbent upon flood educators to identify in given scenarios what level of community 
they are addressing, and adapt their modes accordingly. Fundamentally, what matters is 
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that the individual who is the target of the flood education messages conceives that he or 
she is part of a larger group of people operating with a set of normative agreements about 
what it means to be a part of that community. Keller offers a definition that works for this 
purpose: “To qualify for community, social categorization must be translated into a 
consciousness of kind, a sense of belonging, and a shared destiny, past or future.”100 The 
community at stake here is, most basically, of the type that Cohen explains as 
“symbolic,” by which he means not that it is shifting or illusory, but rather that it is self-
defining to individuals and “refer[s] to more substantial areas of their identities.”  
Understood in this context, “Community is more than oratorical abstraction: it hinges 
crucially on consciousness.”101 This kind of community is constructed symbolically, 
Cohen argues, and becomes a “resource and repository of meaning.” 
 Following von Zomeren et al. I define community identity in the context of social 
identity, which “refers to the socially shared understandings of what it means to be a 
group member.”102 This sort of identity centers on group belonging rather than on 
assertion of individual traits, or on the connection of an individual to the group itself.  It 
presumes that, insofar as flood preparedness actions are concerned, one will be motivated 
to act based on one's identification as a member of a flood-prepared community (such as 
the city where they live, or perhaps as part of a group of emergency managers or 
volunteer watershed monitors which has identified itself as flood-prepared).  In some 
cases, the majority of a community may have control over the decision to live by a river, 
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and take pride in having made a decision to be flood-prepared. In other cases, such as 
low-income communities with limited options, the need to be prepared may be one of 
many difficult realities in their lives. Although the circumstances of the community might 
require different messages, in either case, the identity of the individual is linked to their 
sense of belonging to a flood-prepared community. 
 In many ways, these definitions blur the distinctions between “community” and 
“identity” because the sense of belonging required to form a “community” is also the 
basis of the identity itself. What matters for those designing flood education messages is 
that they understand their job as not merely educating about what actions to take, but also 
about what community identity to conceive. If disaster cultures emerge naturally in ways 
that do not always support flood preparedness, then educators must help to redefine a 
disaster culture that incorporates better scientific and technical knowledge about the risk, 
and also stronger agreement about how the community prepares for and effectively 
responds to flood risk. Considered another way, the flood educator becomes a facilitator 
of dialogue within the community about flood risk, and aims to achieve consensus on one 
critical point: that the community is a flood-ready one. 
 Flood education programming that helps to build a community identity around 
flood-related risk is the third central component of the theoretical framework proposed in 
the preceding sections. Specifically: 
 •  I have proposed that flood education should be guided by a series of three 
best practices that provide information about and demonstrate preparedness behaviors:   
1. Demonstrate preparedness behaviors  
2. Provide information about actions to take to reduce losses 
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3. Repeat messages multiple times, from multiple sources, through 
multiple channels of communication. 
 •   I have also proposed that such education should call on social networks 
and relationships to promote the practice of milling, so that individuals will share 
information about their own preparedness steps and encourage their friends, families and 
neighbors to take similar steps.  
 •  Finally, a successful flood education program should craft messages that 
cultivate a community’s sense of collective belonging and shared response to flood 
related threats. In doing so, programs can motivate people to prepare not merely for 
themselves, but also for the sake of their community.   
PART IV: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 Having proposed a theoretical framework for flood education, in this section I use 
this framework for three purposes:  1) to identify the successes and failures of the past 
flood education efforts at employing the strategies proposed in the theoretical framework; 
2) to gain insights from the approaches of the earthquake sector of the natural hazard 
(which has employed actionable risk communication strategies in its education programs, 
and has begun to develop a community identity around risk); and 3) to make 
recommendations for improving flood policies and programs so that they will better 
motivate preparedness among public audiences. Toward this end, in what follows I first 
provide an overview of the methods I use to evaluate past and present preparedness 
programs. Second, I analyze a series of materials produced by the earthquake and flood 
education sectors to provide examples of how the principles of the framework have, and 
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have not, been used by these sectors of the natural hazard community.  
A. Methods: 
 
 Drawing on an extensive collection of flood and earthquake education materials, 
such as websites and videos, brochures, reports, and various other components of 
education campaigns, I first assess whether and how these materials incorporate the three 
primary components of the theoretical hazard education model -- best practices, milling, 
and cultivating a community identity around risk -- proposed in the preceding section on 
developing a community identity around risk. In all cases, the analysis considers the 
content of the materials, including text and graphic design. Where information about 
distribution is available and relevant, the analysis also considers the method and strategy 
for dissemination of the materials. More specifically, in reviewing each material, I assess 
whether the material does the following: 
a) Incorporates the “best practices” of the actionable risk communication model: 
- Does it demonstrate preparedness behaviors? 
-  Does it provide information about actions to take to reduce losses? 
- Does it repeat messages multiple times, from multiple sources, through   
 multiple channels of communication? 
b) Promotes “milling” about preparedness 
- Does it encourage the sharing of information with others? 
- Does it encourage the seeking out of further information? 
c) Cultivates a community identity around risk 
- Does it incorporate understandings about community, group, and    
 collective action and responsibility? 
- Does it engender feelings of community belonging? 
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 To better understand the logic of the earthquake programs, I gained insights from 
federal employees and key leaders who have influenced, established and now lead the 
various programs (such as the Great California ShakeOut) and educationally focused 
collaborations (such as the Redwood Coast Tsunami Working Group) that guide these 
programs. Because I intend to inform efforts to create effective risk education programs, I 
focus on the most relevant examples of how the earthquake sector’s efforts have met the 
objectives of the proposed theoretical framework. I then follow with a review of flood 
programs, and recommend ways to improve flood programs so that they might better 
motivate public preparedness. 
B. Analysis 
1.  Earthquake Programs 
 
 Earthquakes are an ever-present threat to Southern California, and the 
consequences of a major earthquake are always enormous.  In the past 10 years, a strong 
coalition of earthquake organizations – including emergency response, federal agencies 
and others – have gathered together to jointly address earthquake risk through technical, 
planning and education responses. The most notable of these programs is the “Great 
California ShakeOut” mentioned in the introduction to this paper. This massive 
emergency preparedness drill, which has now spread across the country and 
internationally, was born in response to the ShakeOut Scenario produced by the United 
States Geological Survey’s Multi-Hazards Demonstration Project in 2008. This 
“Scenario” was a multi-disciplinary research project that demonstrated the anticipated 
effects – including scientific, damage and loss projections, along with shaking 
48 
 
visualizations – of a 7.8 magnitude earthquake on the southernmost 300 km of the San 
Andreas fault, which is considered “a plausible event on the fault most likely to produce a 
major earthquake.”103 The Scenario forecast 1,800 deaths and $213 billion in damages.104 
It also “identified factors that will determine whether the event would be a disaster or a 
catastrophe, that is, whether the event would disrupt southern California for a few years, 
or for decades.” 105 The Scenario was selected to be California's annual “Golden 
Guardian” project for 2008. Golden Guardian projects traditionally involve a mass 
preparedness drill mobilizing emergency responders and institutions. But in a departure 
designed to help the public understand the anticipated impacts of an earthquake of this 
size, the 2008 Golden Guardian drill opened up to the general public through the creation 
of the “Great California ShakeOut.” 
 The Great California ShakeOut invited the public to learn about earthquake safety 
and to collectively engage in a statewide “Drop, Cover, Hold On” drill. Headed by the 
Southern California Earthquake Center (SCEC), a coalition of southern California 
earthquake organizations (now known as the Earthquake Country Alliance) used the 
scenario to rally public attention around the earthquake scenario. This coalition formed 
the Great California ShakeOut preparedness drill with a goal of engaging 5 million 
participants in what was “initially conceived as a once-in-a-lifetime event.”106 Working 
with public institutions, governments, schools, and through direct-to-public 
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advertisements, the Great California ShakeOut enrolled 5.4 million participants in its first 
year. Participants joined through schools, hospitals, workplaces and as individuals, all of 
which organized their own “Drop, Cover, Hold On” drills in their own locations, timed 
for 10:00 a.m. on November 13, 2008. Although emergency management drills generally 
operate under highly regimented and controlled exercises, the Shakeout allowed 
workplaces, emergency management offices, child care centers, schools and other 
locations to rally their members in the way that worked for them, and then to report about 
it afterward through photo and story submissions online. By 2011, the fifth year of the 
event, ShakeOuts had spread to multiple states and countries. 
 ShakeOut organizers deliberately and self-consciously incorporated Mileti's and 
others’ social science research into the program design.  The result is a campaign that is 
part education, part social networking, and part mass practice for an earthquake disaster. 
Participants who visit the ShakeOut website, which is the primary registration and 
marketing device for the event, encounter an extensive amount of preparedness 
information about what are now a series of different earthquake scenarios that respond to 
different regions within the state of California. Participants also can register to participate 
during the Shakeout drills, and can exchange photos, videos, and stories of their 
preparation and drill exercises.  Because it is the primary vehicle for dissemination, I 
have used the website www.shakeout.org as the source of materials for the campaign 
(including reports, brochures and marketing pieces, which are also available in hard copy 
and online). 
 Although the Shakeout is the most prominent of the earthquake education efforts, 
partnerships and organizations including the Earthquake Country Alliance (ECA), the 
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Redwood Coast Tsunami Working Group (RCTWG), and the California Emergency 
Management Agency (CAL-EMA), have initiated other complementary efforts and 
websites to help disseminate earthquake preparedness messages. RCTWG produces the 
Living on Shaky Ground magazine series and has coordinated full-scale tsunami 
evacuation drills and emergency warning system tests in California. CAL-EMA publishes 
hazards maps and preparedness information for earthquakes, and participates in many 
collaborative education initiatives. One frequently used resource is the Putting Down 
Roots in Earthquake Country handbook, which the SCEC and the Earthquake Country 
Alliance (ECA) annually revise and release. The publication, first produced by SCEC in 
1995, is produced now annually in partnership with the Earthquake Country Alliance, in 
both English and Spanish, and it includes a regional version for the San Francisco Bay, 
developed by United States Geological Survey (USGS) with partners. The SCEC views 
“Putting Down Roots” as not just an online handbook, but also as a “framework for 
providing earthquake science, mitigation and preparedness information to the public.”107 
Additionally, the ECA also organizes the Dare to Prepare campaign, which focuses on 
preparation actions. 
 A different group has organized a public earthquake education campaign, Totally 
Unprepared, which takes a younger, edgier tone than traditional bureaucratic or 
governmental programs. The Totally Unprepared campaign is organized by CAL-EMA, 
the California Earthquake Authority, and the Alfred E. Alquist Seismic Safety 
Commission. The website uses urban lingo, jokes, humor and games to share earthquake 
preparedness messages. The Totally Unprepared group acknowledges the social science 
research of Mileti and colleagues and justifies its approach by linking to the three 
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following objectives derived directly from actionable risk communication theory: 
 1) delivering concise information about preventing future loss instead of generic  
  incident-based messages; and 
 
 2) providing branded messaging from multiple sources through multiple channels  
  over time instead of focused on one day; and 
 
 3) facilitating “observed preparation behavior”108 
 
 Other organizations, including FEMA, USGS and the American Red Cross are 
also involved in the ShakeOut as well as other earthquake planning activities.  For the 
purpose of the following analysis, I have selected the ShakeOut and related projects 
described here because they are the most prominent and also are representative of the 
efforts taken by all of the involved agencies.  These efforts are instructive because they 
do incorporate the tenets of the theoretical framework previously proposed; as such, their 
successes inform the recommendations section of this paper. Let us consider, then, 
whether the ShakeOut materials incorporate best practices, milling, and efforts to 
cultivate a community identity around risk. 
Best Practices: 
Question 1: Does the program material demonstrate preparedness behaviors? 
 
 Demonstration of preparedness behaviors – and most particularly, “Drop, Cover, 
Hold On” - underlies nearly every earthquake safety material produced among the 
California-based organizations involved in the ShakeOut.  One of the central, organizing 
messages of the earthquake safety sector is the “Drop, Cover, Hold On” routine, which 
encourages people to drop wherever they are as soon as they feel shaking, take cover 
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beneath a sturdy object, and hold on until the shaking is over.  This procedure reduces 
common injury from earthquakes, such as glass cutting people’s feet as they try to run 
away from the shaking, and is considered the safest response to shaking. The earthquake 
organizers in Southern California have made this routine a pivotal part of all of their 
educational campaigns, and it is the central activity of the Shakeout annual drill.  All of 
the earthquake organizations working in California (and elsewhere) use the same image 
for demonstration. The “Drop, Cover, Hold On” logo is simply designed with block-style 
graphics (exemplified below in Illustration 4.0) that demonstrate exactly the steps a 
person should take when they feel ground shaking. 
Illustration 4.0 “Drop, Cover, Hold On” logo.  From: 
http://www.shakeout.org/california/downloads/DropCoverHoldOnFlyer.pdf
109
 
 
This image has its own website, (www.dropcoverholdon.org) and is repeated on nearly 
every educational resource that the ShakeOut produces, including videos, brochures for 
ShakeOut organizers, and others.  The image is ubiquitous across the various education 
websites and campaigns that promote earthquake safety in California.   
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 But beyond this graphic image, the ShakeOut website also includes photos of past 
participants engaging in the Drop, Cover, Hold On poses.  The site is populated with 
many photos of people, ranging from parents and children to emergency managers, all 
engaged in Drop, Cover, Hold On activities in their own individual locations: 
Illustration 4.1           Illustration 4.2 
  
4.1: Fairfield, CA:  Joy Gamble: “We're ready for the next quake at JoyJoy's 
Creative Learning in Fairfield, Ca.” 
4.2: San Gabriel Valley Surgical Center, West Covina, CA: “the brave of the 
bravest!!!”110 
Some of the images (such as 4.2) capture an esprit de corps among the groups practicing 
while others involve children or other groups who are engaged in more serious 
simulations (such as 4.1). 
 This approach of using both graphical and photographic representations of desired 
behaviors is used in many of the ShakeOut materials. For instance, the downloadable 
flyer “Shakeout: Individuals and Families Get Ready to ShakeOut” has a clean graphical 
style that shares only a few visual images. First, the logo of the organization, which is 
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simply a geographic image of the state of California with a stylized “ShakeOut,” and 
second, the standard three-part “Drop, Cover, Hold On” graphic, which also includes 
words as well as images. The last image is a photographic example of a father and child 
beneath a table, demonstrating again the desired behavior. The effect is to demonstrate in 
every media what “Drop, Cover, Hold on” looks like. The ShakeOut site also shares 
images of people taking other preparations, such as stockpiling food, or securing utilities. 
Ill. 4.3 Stockpiling food, essentials:          Ill. 4.4 Attaching gas shut-off wrenches:
 111
 
    
 
In an earlier piece produced by a different earthquake education campaign called the 
Emergency Survival Program, fact sheets about securing one's belongings showed clear 
illustrations of secured furniture, appliances, etc.
112
 This approach was repeated in the 
Dare to Prepare campaign, discussed below.  Rather than merely suggesting what to do, 
these images reinforce for the user what it will look like to have one's belongings secured.  
 In a different approach, the Totally Unprepared campaign features short television 
programs in which a pair of hosts (one punk-rock styled, and the other a firefighter) tour 
the homes of famous local celebrities in Southern California to investigate whether or not 
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their home is prepared.  The hosts help the owners systematically identify the weaknesses 
in their preparedness, and show the steps to improve (locate water and gas shut-off 
valves, secure furniture, etc.). In these shows, the participants openly acknowledge their 
desire and need to prepare. 
 Thus, in each of these instances, the materials create visual images of real-life and 
illustrated people taking preparedness actions. Readers and viewers can see what a 
secured home looks like, or what it looks like for a group to “Drop, Cover, Hold On” in 
the middle of a workplace. The emphasis, graphically and from a content perspective, is 
on the demonstration of preparedness actions. 
Question 2: Do the program materials provide information about actions to take to 
prevent future losses? 
 
 Generally, the earthquake preparedness materials focus exclusively on actions to 
take, and very little on levels of risk. The most central messages about how to prepare – 
such as “Drop, Cover, Hold on” – are blanketed everywhere, for everyone. Messages are 
then tiered downward, in order of relevance and importance.  Information about risk and 
probability is provided in these materials for those who are motivated to understand the 
science behind earthquakes and tectonic shift, but these messages are given less play in 
most educational materials. 
 The Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country handbook is an excellent 
example of how materials try to stress action steps.  The handbook is available in hard 
copy, or online as a .pdf that can be downloaded.
113
  Before users can download the 
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document online, the website prompts them first to answer a series of questions about 
their own preparedness. The questions include: “Have you identified hazards in your 
home (heavy items that can fall on you during shaking, unsecured water heaters, etc.) and 
begun to fix them?  Have you created a disaster plan? Have you created a disaster supply 
kit? Have you identified your home's potential weaknesses (house not bolted to 
foundation, unbraced cripple walls, etc.) and begun to fix them? Do you know how to 
protect yourself during an earthquake?” These action steps are reinforced multiple times 
throughout the document, with an emphasis on describing how taking action steps can 
help reduce losses. An interactive tool, “The Seven Steps to Earthquake Safety,” 
describes in detail each of the steps a person or household can take to reduce losses. 
 In yet another collaborative education campaign for earthquake readiness, the 
“Dare to Prepare” campaign encourages people to “Secure Your Space” to protect ones' 
life and property, and family. Announcing that “Shift Happens,” the “Secure Your Space” 
outreach materials detail specific steps (such as strapping furniture and appliances to 
walls, and latching cabinets and retrofitting buildings) in step by step detail to help 
reduce losses during a shaking event. The materials also provide instructions on how to 
hire reputable contractors, and reinforce “Drop, Cover, Hold On” messages 
simultaneously.
114
 
 The Totally Unprepared campaign also features detailed instructions for securing 
items, making emergency wallet cards, developing home and pet earthquake kits, and 
purchasing earthquake insurance. In what may be a nod to Sunstein and Thaler’s work, 
                                                 
114
  Southern California Earthquake Center,  “Secure Your Stuff: Tall Furniture/Bookcases,” Putting 
 Down Roots in Earthquake Country Handbook, 
 http://www.daretoprepare.org/stuff/bookcases.html/ (accessed August 3, 2012).  
 
57 
 
that site also features an email sign-up, asking viewers whether they “need a nudge” to 
prepare. Visitors who sign up will receive occasional emails with reminders and 
information about how to prepare. 
 The trend across the earthquake materials is clear: stressing actions is a key 
component of the message. But as actionable risk communication theory emphasizes, 
simply saying what to do isn't enough. People must also understand that taking actions 
will help reduce losses. The California Emergency Management Agency and the 
California Earthquake Authority worked with the research firm Harris Interactive in 2011 
to conduct tests on public audiences about the kinds of messages that work to promote 
earthquake preparedness. A report from that study revealed the sorts of values and beliefs 
that people hold are closely related to their preparedness behaviors. Consistent with 
Mileti's research findings, that study called for a transition away from messages that 
simply relay “what to do,” and toward messages that also described “why to do it.”115 In 
assessing people’s core values that are related to earthquake preparedness and recovery, 
the study looked into the emotional and affective responses that people rely on for 
making preparedness decisions. Across all demographics, people valued the feeling of 
“protecting one’s family.” Other key values were feelings of ‘control,” “survival” and 
“peace of mind.” Drawing on these values, the report suggests, will motivate better 
preparedness among families. However, the study also cited emotive responses related to 
people’s admission that they were “in denial” about their earthquake risk, and that they 
had failed to prepare. According to the study, these latter responses negatively influence 
preparedness. Such feelings, the study suggests, lead to a lack of peace of mind and self-
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esteem, and start a cycle of defeat in which the individuals end up with the “the idea that 
preparation is futile and can’t be done.”116 
 Overall, these responses to preparedness suggest that that instead of selling fear, 
the campaigns need to sell the fact that action now will make life on the other side of the 
earthquake event look better. The report recommends earthquake organizations relay 
messages that “Preparing now will help your family survive and recover from 
California’s next damaging earthquake,” and that “Taking simple steps to prepare will 
help you get back to normal faster after the next big quake strikes.”117 
 Such messages are populated throughout the earthquake safety sites.  
ShakeOut.org uses nearly that exact language in its “Why Participate?” section, stating 
that “What we do now will determine our quality of life after our next big earthquake.” 
(emphasis original).  The Dare to Prepare campaign uses slightly different language that 
has the same effect when it says “These and other actions will greatly reduce your risk of 
damage or injury, and limit your need for community resources after the next 
earthquake.”118  Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country offers its preparedness 
actions, and notes that actions taken now can reduce losses later: “If we all follow these 
steps, we may save billions of dollars and prevent countless casualties in the next large 
earthquake.”119 
 These examples demonstrate that the earthquake community has adopted the best 
practice of advising about actions to take.  And importantly, it has pushed the envelope of 
                                                 
116
 Harris Interactive, p. 9.  
117
 Ibid, p. 2.  
118
 Southern California Earthquake Center, “Dare to Prepare,” http://www.daretoprepare.org/ 
 (accessed August 3, 2012.  
119
  Southern California Earthquake Center, “The Seven Steps to Earthquake Safety,” Putting Down 
 Roots in Earthquake Country Handbook, http://www.earthquakecountry.info/roots/steps.html 
 (accessed August 3, 2012). 
59 
 
understanding what motivates behavior by focusing on explaining how steps taken now 
to prepare will reduce losses in the future. Where previous generations of educators have 
taken positive steps by creating educational materials that state, “Get an earthquake kit,” 
these newer efforts further recognize the importance of explaining to people how taking 
actions today will reduce losses tomorrow. 
 
Question 3:  Do the program materials repeat messages multiple times, from multiple 
sources, through multiple channels of communication? 
 The Great California ShakeOut is unique within the preparedness field not only 
because of its size, but also because of its design, leadership structure, and organizing 
principles. Although the ShakeOut is organized primarily through the Southern California 
Earthquake Center (SCEC), public branding of the event advertises a variety of 
organizations with equal emphasis. This umbrella approach to advertising the event can 
encourage broader participation from other organizations as it allows all organizations to 
share the glory of a highly successful campaign; however, members of the earthquake 
community and government agencies observing the event still well understand who is the 
lead agency.  Insofar as this approach also incorporates the research imperative to provide 
“dense information” and to brand a campaign with multiple partners, it serves not just the 
institutional partners, but also the public. In other words, what is branded, from the public 
perspective is not the messenger, but the essential message – i.e., practice how to protect 
yourself during an earthquake.   
 Thus, what these earthquake preparedness practices in California demonstrate is 
that the various campaigns, such as the ShakeOut and the Dare to Prepare campaigns, are 
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effective when they work in conjunction with one another.  The “Drop, Cover, Hold On” 
website is promoted on the Dare to Prepare website, along with the ShakeOut activities 
and the Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country handbook. These sites are also 
promoted on the ShakeOut website, and the links between the various initiatives therefore 
allow viewers to move fluidly back and forth among them. The “Drop, Cover, Hold On” 
campaign is also found on the Totally Unprepared website, as is information about the 
Putting Down Roots handbook.  The messages also extend into museums, such as the 
Birch Aquarium in San Diego, which created an exhibit about earthquakes that features 
the “Seven Steps” imagery that is central to the Putting Down Roots handbook.120 A user 
interested in earthquake preparedness in California will find consistent messaging 
through campaigns that are commonly focused on the action steps to take (Dare to 
Prepare, ShakeOut, “Drop, Cover, Hold On”) rather than on any particular organizing 
body.  In fact, it is not easy to discern on any of them who is the sponsoring agency; 
instead, in most cases, there are lists of multiple official organizing groups behind each 
campaign.  The United States Geological Survey (USGS) page for earthquake 
preparedness, as another example, refers visitors to Putting Down Roots handbook and 
the ShakeOut website, as well as to a technical FEMA resource for securing one's home. 
 This approach is deliberate.  In responding to the tenets of actionable risk 
communication, earthquake organizations and campaigns downplay the role of federal 
agencies in branding messages, and instead allow the various smaller organizations – 
including churches, workplaces, state agencies and others – to share the message.  The 
ubiquitous use of “Drop, Cover, Hold On” in all materials, and the shared approach on 
multiples sites of listing the same ways to stabilize furniture and homes, creates a 
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uniform impression for the person seeking information about earthquake information. 
2.  Milling Activities 
 
 Of all of the resources for earthquake safety, the ShakeOut has most prominently 
promoted milling among neighbors, families and friends. From within the ShakeOut 
website, participants can invite friends or family to register for the ShakeOut event, and 
to share information about preparedness. Participants are invited to submit photos of 
themselves engaging in their preparedness activities in their schools, homes or 
businesses, and to view others doing the same.  The ShakeOut website invites the reader 
to “Share Your Experience” and also to invite friends and families to register, as well as 
to encourage employers or other groups to participate.
121
 The intention to promote 
conversation about earthquake preparedness is explicit. In its annual report about the 
Communication, Education and Outreach program, the SCEC acknowledges that the 
ShakeOut is about more than informing Californians about their earthquake risk: “The 
ShakeOut teaches people a life-saving response behavior while fostering a sense of 
community that facilitates further dialogue and preparedness.”122 For the ShakeOut 
process, making people talk to one another is essential. 
 In a different approach, Totally Unprepared suggests that people “throw a party 
for earthquake awareness,” in order to build neighborly connections that people can draw 
on for help in times of an earthquake.
123
 A general preparedness campaign known as “72 
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hours” and organized by the San Francisco, California Department of Emergency 
Management, aims to help people survive the first 72 hours after any major disaster, 
when critical power and other services might be off-line. Notably, the site has a link to 
“Email this site to a friend,” which is the kind of activity that fosters milling and the 
spread of preparedness behaviors.
124 
In these and other ways, the guiding principles of 
actionable risk communication are clearly at play in the earthquake campaigns.  
 The “Living on Shaky Ground” campaign of the Redwood Coast Tsunami 
Working Group offers much technical information about tsunamis, earthquakes and how 
to prepare, but also clearly incorporates some milling efforts. A promotional banner, 
“Seven Steps that May Save Your Life,” encourages people to learn about how to protect 
their home, and then “Talk to your family about what you have learned.” 125 A letter by 
the group’s director, Lori Dengler, to the local newspaper, the Times-Standard/Humboldt 
Beacon encourages people to use the annual tsunami drill as a chance to “discuss tsunami 
and earthquake safety with family, friends and co-workers.”126 These messages are 
consistent throughout the campaign’s materials. 
 Overall, milling efforts are less entrenched than the best practices (provide 
information about actions to take to reduce losses, demonstrate preparedness behaviors, 
repeat information through multiple sources, multiple times, through multiple channels) 
in earthquake preparedness campaigns. The Putting Down Roots campaign, for instance, 
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is not very explicit in its encouragement of milling. It encourages people to create a 
family preparedness plan, and then to “Share your plan with people who take care of your 
children, pets, or home,”127 but beyond this it largely handles preparedness as a 
household activity rather than one to be shared with neighbors and others. The earthquake 
community has begun a concerted effort, however, to educate partner organizations about 
the importance of milling to preparedness activities. When viewed all together, these 
small steps to promote milling create a consistent message to people that seeking out and 
sharing news about preparedness, and reflecting on these same preparedness behaviors 
with neighbors and others, is part of the task of getting ready for an earthquake event. 
3.  Community Identity Around Risk 
 
 Although the SCEC and partner organizations may not explicitly acknowledge 
that they are building a community identity around risk, their materials reflect an 
awareness of the need for people to experience a sense of belonging and community 
response as the context of their preparedness actions. For instance, the logos for both the 
Great California ShakeOut and the Earthquake Country Alliance prominently feature 
images of the state of California. The logos do not attempt to brand a particular concept 
or identity beyond that of California itself, but the intention is clear when paired with 
Earthquake Country Alliance's slogan: “We're all in this together.” Conceived by Lucile 
Jones, the leading seismologist and earthquake educator with USGS, this slogan 
exemplifies an effort by the earthquake organizations to relay that being a Californian 
means being prepared for an earthquake. 
                                                 
127
 Southern California Earthquake Center, “#2: Create a disaster-preparedness plan,”  
 Putting Down Roots in Earthquake Country Handbook, 
 http://www.earthquakecountry.info/roots/step2.html (accessed August 3, 2012). 
64 
 
Ill.4.5 Great California ShakeOut 
128
              Ill. 4.6 Earthquake Country Alliance
129
        
             
 
The ShakeOut logo on the left has a subtle crack in the words, suggesting a shift in the 
tectonic plates that cause earthquakes. Together with the easily recognizable image of the 
state of California, this logo links the risk of earthquakes to those who identify with 
California as a geographical place.  The Earthquake Country Alliance logo (Ill. 4.6) puts a 
bulls-eye on top of the state of California, again layering risk on top of geography.  Upon 
seeing these logos, viewers are invited to reflect with one another on their shared 
geography, and the risk that it presents. All participants can look to these logos and 
reflect, “Yes, that is me. I am a Californian, a person who lives in a place where 
earthquake risk happens.” The ECA's slogan, “We're All In This Together,” makes 
explicit that the experience of risk is something that is shared collectively. Thinking back 
to Cohen's definition of community as something that “refers to the more substantial 
areas of their identities,” the shared sense of risk and geography that is evoked by these 
logos help to cultivate such a community.  When such a sense of community exists, the 
threat of earthquake damage in California does not represent merely individual damage to 
those living there, but rather, it represents complete devastation of the community. In 
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treating people as members of a community – as having an identity that is collective – 
these logos, in all their simplicity, evoke the importance of a collective response. 
 To elaborate this point, the other earthquake programs draw out a sense of 
collective responsibility to prepare. The Dare to Prepare campaign, for instance, cautions 
that taking steps now to prepare will “limit your need for community resources after the 
next earthquake.”130 Putting Down Roots encourages individuals to “Work with your 
neighbors to identify who has skills and resources that will be useful in an emergency, 
and who may need special attention (children, elderly, disabled, etc.).”131  Totally 
Unprepared encourages people to “Put their friends in their earthquake kit… [because] 
establishing meaningful connections with the people who live around you and can help 
you survive will make earthquake recovery infinitely more bearable.” These approaches 
all work to create the experience of earthquakes as a collective experience, and therefore, 
as something that requires a collective – rather than an individual – response to the risk. 
 The ShakeOut campaign is also deliberate in fostering a community response to 
risk. In practice, the earthquake campaigns recruit the majority of participants through 
organizations, including churches, hospitals, workplaces and schools. This recruitment 
strategy represents a real reconsideration of the ways that agencies like FEMA and others 
have traditionally conceived of how people plan to prepare.  Rather than doing what the 
government tells them to do, earthquake campaigns urge people to do what their 
employers, neighbors or churches are doing. The ShakeOut website has special 
instructions for organizing neighbors to prepare, that includes the creation of a 
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“neighborhood earthquake plan.” But rather than serving to start merely a cascade of 
social influence, earthquake agencies are in fact also promoting a sense of belonging. For 
instance, ShakeOut resources include posters, banners, videos and other materials that 
ShakeOut organizers can use in their own homes, schools, or organizations. One of these 
is a poster that says simply, “Join Us for the Largest Earthquake Drill in U.S. History.”132 
This flyer, with its stark graphic design and use of the words “largest” and “history,” 
creates a sense of a burgeoning social movement, rather than merely an earthquake drill. 
The message is not about “getting a kit,” but instead about participating in something 
larger, a collective, community event. The SCEC, as mentioned earlier, identifies the 
work of the ShakeOut as “fostering a sense of community” around preparedness.133 
 Although this collective orientation comes out clearly in the ShakeOut campaign, 
it is not yet universal among the earthquake organizations. The Dare to Prepare 
campaign, for instance, encourages people to share their plan with neighbors, but does 
not follow this with any overt steps to create a community identity around earthquake 
risk. In some instances, earthquake organizations execute some, but not all, of the 
potential practices for cultivating a community identity around risk. For instance, the 
Totally Unprepared campaign focuses very much on social identities and popular 
responses, and tries to be inclusive of all types people (including punk rockers, 
firefighters, multiple ethnicities, “Brooklyn Hipsters” and “Wannabe Hippies”), but does 
not connect these diverse individuals to a collective threat in a way that creates a 
common, shared identity around risk. Specifically, by emphasizing the relevance of risk 
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to different types of people, Totally Unprepared gets across the idea that “preparedness is 
for you,” but it does not effectively counter this individual response with messaging that 
“preparedness is something you do for your community.” Thus, not all of the efforts of 
the earthquake community have hit the mark. But, as I demonstrate below, they have in 
much greater measure than in the floodplain community, and with increasing success. 
Central to the earthquake community’s programming is a concerted effort to create a 
community identity around risk that motivates individuals to prepare, for their own sake, 
and sometimes for the sake of their community. Thus, earthquake preparedness 
campaigns have, in many cases, succeeded in incorporating earthquakes into the shared 
and collective life of whole communities. Let us turn, then, to the flood education 
materials, for the purpose of evaluating their current impact and potential.  
2. Flood Education Materials 
 
 The earthquake community has clearly organized its various campaigns around a 
few central organizing premises about what to do to prepare for an earthquake. Flooding, 
however, poses a different kind of threat than earthquakes, and it requires a different 
public response. Various federal agencies and non-profit organizations have conducted 
flood education programs, but unlike the earthquake community, the floodplain 
management community has not identified a core statement (akin to “Drop, Cover, Hold 
On”) that explains an appropriate and uniform behavioral response to floods. This may be 
a function of the hazard itself, as flooding (excluding flash flooding) generally happens 
over a longer period of time, while earthquakes occur suddenly and with little warning, 
and require immediate response. It may also be a matter of how the public perceives the 
associated risk. For instance, some have suggested that people are very afraid of 
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earthquakes because they make people feel “out of control.”134 With flooding, longer lead 
time and the perceived localized nature of flooding may cause people to feel they have 
more control over the hazard. In truth, with modern forecasting technology, flooding 
impacts from any given event are much easier to predict than earthquake impacts, which 
will range vastly between, say, a 6.0 and an 8.0 magnitude quake. Thus, while floods may 
cost citizens many times as much in damages when compared to earthquakes, and while 
identifying a proper level of preparedness might be much easier, people may still be less 
motivated to prepare for floods than earthquakes.
135
   
 But even if such irrationality persists, citizens’ failure to prepare for floods may 
also be due to the failure of past public education campaigns to relay effective messages 
about flood risk and preparedness – even to officials and emergency management 
audiences. The problem comes through prominently in this review of approximately 100 
pieces of flood education materials, including those readily available to the public 
through federal and public websites and distribution channels (such as brochures and 
pamphlets), as well as those in a collection developed over the past 15 years by the Flood 
Safety Project in Boulder, CO. 
 The materials in this latter collection focus heavily but not exclusively on flood 
education developed specifically for the states of Texas and Colorado, which are both 
among the most flood-prone states in the nation, and therefore provide a revealing 
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historical perspective. Specifically, the materials from the Flood Safety Project include 
hard-copy and video materials that document a decade or more of flood-education efforts.  
The remaining materials I will review include those from federal agencies and non-profit 
organizations including relief and recovery groups such as the American Red Cross, flood 
control districts, watershed associations, municipalities and other organizations 
concerned with flood education. These materials usually are more recently developed and 
allow me to single out pieces designed for general or national distribution, such as the 
Federal Emergency Management Agency's (FEMA) Ready.gov website and the National 
Weather Service (NWS) flood education materials. Together, FEMA and the National 
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA)'s NWS offices comprise the primary 
repository of national flood education efforts.  Their campaigns are central to this 
analysis.   
 As background, the floodplain management community, and its limitations, 
should be understood within its distinct institutional context. Unlike the earthquake 
community, the floodplain management community does not have a collaboration of 
organizations working closely to create consistent messaging about flood risk and 
preparedness.  Although the Association of State Floodplain Managers (ASFPM) is a 
leader in floodplain management policy, the organization has historically focused on 
policy initiatives to achieve its mission, such as those related to land use and insurance, 
and less on broad public education.  It has engaged Dr. Dennis Mileti, inviting him to 
present his social science research about preparedness to floodplain managers, and it does 
undertake other public education programs. But for the purpose of educating the public 
about flooding, ASFPM does not play the sort of role, for instance, that the SCEC plays 
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in earthquakes. While the state chapters do hold some promise for picking up the mantle 
for public education and initiatives at the local level, my review of their materials 
alongside those of national organizations reveals that the floodplain management 
community has been less effective than the earthquake community in meeting the goals 
of the previously proposed theoretical framework. Specifically, although a large number 
of the reviewed materials attempt to offer information about how to prepare for a flood, 
few demonstrate preparedness behaviors. Furthermore, as I discuss below, the messages 
about how to prepare are not consistent in their content (what to do), language (how to 
describe the action) or tone (style of delivery). Finally, milling is only rarely promoted, 
and almost none of the flood-related education materials have attempted to, or succeeded 
in, cultivating a community identity around risk. 
 In discussing these limitations, my analysis will review a representative sample of 
flood education efforts, which will be used to inform the next section of the paper, where 
I make recommendations for improving flood education programs and policies. The 
subset of chosen materials represent the variety of types of materials reviewed (website, 
brochure, etc.) and the range of effectiveness in reaching the three imperatives of the 
theoretical framework developed in Part III:  best practices, milling and community 
identity around risk. 
2. Best Practices 
 While flood education efforts do succeed in following the best practice of 
directing people about what actions to take, they have been less effective at 
demonstrating preparedness and at repeating messages multiple times from multiple 
sources through multiple channels. Let us examine how effective the floodplain 
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management community has been in meeting each of the three best practices of the 
proposed framework (demonstrate preparedness behaviors, provide information about 
actions to take to reduce losses, and repeat messages multiple times, from multiple 
sources, through multiple channels). 
Question 1: Does the program material demonstrate preparedness behaviors? 
 
 As the federal agency in charge of hazards response and preparation, FEMA is a 
central, recognizable source of information on flood preparedness. FEMA’s flood 
awareness page on its Ready.gov website (its central source for hazard preparedness), 
organizes preparedness information by hazard type.  Information about flooding is found 
under the Natural Hazards category, and is organized by actions one should take before, 
during and after a flood. This approach of dividing flooding actions into before, during 
and after a flood event is common among many organizations, and it reflects an 
awareness that flood events present safety challenges that can be addressed over the 
sometimes large number of days it takes for a flood to build, crest and then recede.  
Despite the fact that the site is formed as a resource for preparedness information, the 
flood portion of the site offers essentially no demonstrations of how to prepare.  
Throughout all sections related to flooding (before, during and after a flood, and the 
additional resource sections), only one single image shows what preparedness looks like.  
That image is of a sandbagged home, and is suggestive of a family that has prepared in 
advance of a pending flood.  The image has no corresponding caption, and no text on the 
page references sandbagging as a technique. The photo is placed in the “during a flood” 
section, but sandbagging is something that must be done in advance of an expected flood 
in order to have any effect.  A visitor to the site looking for information about how to 
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prepare would be left with many questions: Is sand-bagging the first step, or a last-ditch 
effort?  Should everyone sandbag?  How does one properly sandbag?  How does 
sandbagging work?  DOES sandbagging work? None of these issues is addressed on the 
site. 
Ill. 4.7 FEMA Floodsmart.gov photo of sandbagged home
136
 
 
This image, from http://www.ready.gov/floodawareness, stands alone on the page 
without explanation or description of what it represents and means for homeowners. 
 
 Further, external links to various pamphlets, brochures and “interactive flood risk 
resources” are designed to educate people about flooding, but none of these take the step 
of actually demonstrating how to prepare for floods. 
 Another FEMA website, Floodsmart.gov, is the central site of the National Flood 
Insurance Program, and is the repository of much of the federal government’s public 
flood education information. But as with the Ready.gov site, the Floodsmart.gov site fails 
to demonstrate any preparedness behaviors. In contrast to the Shakeout website, which 
has a photo of person engaged in “Drop, Cover, Hold On” as the top image, the 
Floodsmart.gov site has an image of devastation after a hurricane: 
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Ill. 4.8.  FEMA Floodsmart.gov home page image
137
 
 
 
Further, the site is populated with tense and dramatic video footage of floods and flood 
damage. It offers one video that emphasizes how two homeowners with similar damage 
from a flood fared very differently because one owner had flood insurance, while the 
other did not. This video does demonstrate some of the benefits of flood insurance, 
perhaps, but it fails to meet effectively demonstrate what preparedness looks like in the 
context of safeguarding one’s home. The video does not, for instance, offer images of 
someone talking with an insurance agent, or examining their home’s flood-proofing 
options. The emphasis is on fearful and dramatic images of flood loss, in an effort to 
motivate individuals to “understand their flood risk” and purchase flood insurance.  
 The National Weather Service (NWS) is another federal agency involved in 
flooding through its forecast and warning capacities.
 
Historically, NWS has not provided 
extensive preparedness information, but nonetheless, public and professional audiences 
alike rely heavily on NWS flood forecasts and guidance about impending flood events.  
Because safety is an important concern of NWS meteorologists and hydrologists, the 
NWS has produced a few initiatives pointed at this goal. 
 While these initiatives are designed to promote flood safety, they fail to 
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demonstrate safety in practice. One of the earliest examples is a booklet NWS began 
producing a few decades ago, known as Floods: The Awesome Power.  This booklet is 
still in production and is revised periodically.
138
 It contains full-color graphics of floods 
and storms, information on flood risk, fatalities and preparation, but notably does not 
visually demonstrate a single preparedness behavior throughout its 16 pages.  Another 
example of the failure to demonstrate desired behaviors is NWS’ “Flood Safety” website 
that focuses on its annual “Flood Safety Awareness Week” held each March.139  Here, 
rather than highlighting how to prepare, the webpage starts off with a listing of flood 
fatalities by year, and then provides links to forecast tools as well as other sources of 
scientific information about flooding.  At the end of a very long mass of densely packed 
information, the web page offers a “flood safety” section with a series of disconnected 
links to information such as an audio flood awareness public service announcement and 
graphics of “natural hazards fatalities.”140 None of these links bring the viewer to a page 
that demonstrates actual preparedness behaviors. As with the Floodsmart.gov site, one 
video produced by NWS, “Water’s Fury” provides tense and dramatic footage of past 
flood events alongside interviews with victims who made the wrong flood response 
decision. This movie, while full of dramatic quality, has the unintended consequence of 
demonstrating visually the wrong decisions, over and over.
141
  Thus, although this page is 
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linked on the “flood safety” section of NWS’s “Flood Safety” website, viewers of this 
video are presented with fearful images and images of what not to do – and none about 
what they ought to do to prepare for flooding. 
 It is worth pausing at this point to recognize one good and important NWS flood 
campaign, “Turn Around, Don’t Drown.”142 The “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” slogan 
was created by an NWS employee to warn drivers of the dangers of driving on wet roads.  
This educational campaign has gained traction through the creation of stickers, posters, 
magnets, videos and other materials, and has been used by other organizations engaged in 
flood education.  As will be described further below, the campaign meets the best practice 
imperatives of the framework. Specifically, the “Turn Around, Down Drown” campaign 
has had occasional success in being represented visually through public service 
announcements and other promotional videos. For instance, a PSA produced by the 
Susquehanna River Basin Commission shows a mother driving her son through a tense 
rainstorm. At the last minute, the white-knuckled mother makes the right decision, and 
turns her sport utility vehicle around and drives away from a dark, wet road.
143
  The 
Nurture Nature Center in Easton, Pennsylvania, a non-profit engaged in flood education, 
also visually demonstrated the Turn Around, Don’t Drown concept in an animated video, 
“The Day of the Flood.”144  This video shows a commercial truck that is stopped from 
driving onto a wet road by a stationed police officer with a stop sign. The truck safely 
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turns around and finds an alternate route. While these two campaigns are effective in 
demonstrating one particular preparedness behavior, they are exceptions to the broader 
set of flood education efforts. Perhaps because of the frequency of flooding throughout 
the United States, and the abundant video and photographic footage of the shocking 
damage flooding can create, the flood education materials have tended to demonstrate 
damage from flooding rather than preparedness actions. “Turn Around, Don’t Drown,” 
because of its clear and concise action statement, has lent itself more easily to visual 
demonstrations of preparedness, and should be looked to as an example for the floodplain 
management community for how to achieve this best practice. 
 Most recently, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration has revised 
its strategic plan, and created a public education campaign called “Weather-Ready 
Nation” which aims to build “community resiliency” to extreme weather events, 
including floods.
145
 The initiative aims to improve NWS's forecast and research 
capacities for the purpose of improving decision-making support services for emergency 
managers, first responders, governments, businesses and public audiences. The Weather-
Ready campaign is clever and innovative, and importantly, focuses on the need to prepare 
for extreme weather events. The campaign slogan “Be a Force of Nature” promotes 
“never bowing to extreme weather. It means taking appropriate actions before, during and 
after extreme weather.”146 Like the ShakeOut campaign, the Weather-Ready Nation 
campaign includes media toolkits that people can download and use in their own 
locations, including posters and social media tools, including a “Be a Force of Nature” 
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widget that provides quick access to the campaign’s various features. This campaign 
takes some steps toward demonstrating preparedness behaviors. For instance, the “Be a 
Force of Nature Poster,” shows people receiving cell phone alerts about weather 
warnings. But while the campaign urges people to “Know Your Risk. Take Action. Be an 
Example,” it provides few visual examples of what preparedness looks like.147 Thus, 
while the campaign does share stories of people who made wise decisions and avoided 
bad results, it does not visually demonstrate those decisions to the public. 
 In addition to these national campaigns, flood-prone communities often rely on 
locally produced and region-specific materials to learn about flooding in their area. These 
sorts of documents are prepared for specific communities and they often include flood 
histories of the region, checklists for readiness, and directions from the emergency 
management agency about how to properly prepare and where to look for more 
information during times of high water. These materials are often more technical in 
nature because they point to local and specific issues. Generally, because these are often 
one-time efforts for a discrete population, and because the authors are working in 
isolation from the rest of the floodplain management community, these guides are 
uninformed by social science imperatives for preparedness. Some do make some progress 
in demonstrating preparedness. For example, the Boulder County Transportation 
Department produced a Flood Protection Handbook in January 2002; a 40-page 
document that addresses flood hazards, government programs, flood preparedness and 
flood-proofing, and how to handle times of flooding and recovery.
148
 This handbook has 
several images throughout that demonstrate technical methods for making homes more 
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flood-resistant, such as elevating homes, installing a standpipe “donut” or floor drain 
plug, or turning electricity off.  Others, such as the Yardley Borough Flood Book for 
Residents, from the Yardley, PA emergency management office are produced without 
extensive publishing support and lack graphic images demonstrating preparedness.
149
   
The Regional County Flood Control District in Clark County, Nevada, is a highly active 
organization when it comes to public flood information. But it, too, often heeds the 
instinct to advertise flood damage, rather than preparedness.  In an annual billboard 
campaign to advertise flood safety, organizers succumbed to the instinct to demonstrate 
cars underwater.  The images are well-designed and eye-catching, but demonstrate the 
wrong, rather than the right, preparedness behavior. 
Ill. 4.9 2011 Billboard Contest Winner, Regional Flood Control Dist. Clark County, 
NV
150
 
 
 
 Together, this review of local and national efforts suggests that overall, while the 
floodplain management community has made various efforts to educate the public about 
how to prepare for flooding, few of these efforts have heeded the best practice of 
demonstrating preparedness actions. Emphasis has been placed on “knowing your risk” 
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and increasing “flood awareness” instead of showing people what preparedness could 
look like in their own lives. 
Question 2:  Does the program material provide information about actions to take to 
prevent future losses? 
 
 Generally, flood education materials have been more effective in providing 
information about actions individuals can take to prepare for floods, than they have been 
in demonstrating how to take those actions.  For instance, FEMA’s Ready.gov site offers 
very little direct instruction about actions to take. In the category of how to prepare 
before a flood, the site offers just five generic bulleted recommendations, such as “Build 
an emergency kit” and “make a family communications plan.”  Another of the bulleted 
items advises people in one sentence to “avoid building in a floodplain unless you elevate 
and reinforce your home,” without providing any further information about how to 
elevate or reinforce one’s home. Although the site is called Ready.gov and is ostensibly 
about preparedness for hazards, the flood hazard section of the site devotes substantially 
more space and energy into describing the various causes of flooding, and how to stay 
safe after a flood, than it does to providing guidance on how to get ready for them. For 
those who do experience a flood and must evacuate, FEMA suggests moving one’s 
belongings upstairs, securing one’s home, turning off electrical equipment, and 
evacuating safely by avoiding driving through water.  Notably absent are the multiple 
pages of detailed information, tiered behind short summary messages that populate the 
earthquake sites. Further, the site does little to suggest how preparing now will reduce 
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losses later.
151
 
 The Floodsmart.gov site, as another example, focuses much of its information on 
issues related to insurance and “understanding risk,” “risk scenarios,” and “defining risk.”  
It uses calculators to help visitors assess their risk and calculate flood loss damage under 
various scenarios. The “Flood Risk Scenarios” tool asks visitors to find out: “What are 
your chances of experiencing a flood?”152  The site’s apparent purpose is to provide 
information about flood insurance and flood loss reduction. But throughout the entire of 
the Floodsmart.gov site, only one text-only page offers visitors any direction on what to 
do to prepare to minimize losses beyond the purchase of flood insurance. The 
preparedness directions it does offer are in fact more extensive than those offered in the 
Ready.gov site, and address what should be in an emergency plan, for instance. But 
preparedness represents a very small portion of the site’s information. Finally, despite the 
fact that various literatures argue repeatedly that hazard awareness is insufficient for 
motivating preparedness, the information on both the Floodsmart.gov and Ready.gov site 
focuses on “being aware” that a flood can occur. Neither site emphasizes the ways in 
which preparedness behaviors taken now will reduce losses later. 
 NWS’s efforts at flood risk education also offer relatively little effective 
instruction about how to be safe.  Although the NWS Flood Watch and Warning 
statements sometimes make one or two sentence statements about the need to monitor 
flood levels and look for evacuation notices, these are not primarily used as sources of 
information for action steps. Instead, as mentioned earlier, NWS segments its flood safety 
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information on its Flood Safety site, which does link to some effective materials for 
information about how to prepare. The site links, for instance, to a Flood Emergency 
Checklist prepared by the American Red Cross, which is offered in both English and 
Spanish languages. Primarily, the site offers a series of links to technical forecast tools 
that can help an individual to identify when a flood hazard may be imminent. If used 
properly, the tools that are offered on the Flood Safety site, such as the Advanced 
Hydrologic Prediction Service (AHPS), can be critical in helping communities to guard 
against flood losses. The AHPS site shares information about predicted river levels and 
crest times, allowing individuals and emergency managers alike to plan for needed 
evacuations and other preparedness actions.
153
 But without proper explanation, the 
meaning of these tools is not clear to the reader who comes to the site seeking 
information about how to prepare. The NWS site takes no steps to connect the use of 
these tools to preparedness actions, or to describe how using the tools can reduce losses 
in the future.    
 The Floods: The Awesome Power booklet, as another example, provides extensive 
information about how to “Know Your Risk” through various tools, encourages the use of 
NOAA weather radios and provides details about the creation of emergency preparedness 
plans and evacuation strategies. As with the other NWS and NOAA pieces, however, the 
emphasis is on learning about the power of floods, and not what to do to prepare.
154
  
Similarly, the Weather-Ready Nation site, for all of its efforts to advance preparedness, 
offers very little in the way of instruction of its own, and refers visitors back to the 
Ready.gov site to learn how to prepare. 
                                                 
153
  National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, National Weather Service, Advanced 
 Hydrologic Prediction Service, http://water.weather.gov/ahps (accessed August 3, 2012). 
154
  Floods: The Awesome Power, 2005.  
82 
 
 As with the first best practice, the “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” campaign tops 
the list of successful campaigns when it comes to providing instruction about how to take 
action.  Its very slogan, in fact, combines clear information about what action to take 
(Turn Around) and also about how doing so will reduce losses (Don’t Drown).  Because 
of its emphasis on how the action will help reduce losses, “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” 
is arguably more effective even than “Drop, Cover, Hold On” as a rallying phrase for 
action. 
 Local flood education materials are more effective than their national counterparts 
at providing detailed information about action steps to take. The Yardley Borough Flood 
Book, for instance, provides pages of text information and emergency checklists that help 
residents of that borough understand the various preparedness options they have. It 
details safety steps related to evacuation, securing cabinets and other household furniture 
and objects, and keeping toxic waste items out of floodplains. This book provides 
unusual detail about practices such as removing carpet in advance of a flood, which will 
reduce the costs of replacing it later. The book also appears to have taken a tip from 
social science research because it follows such advice with the note that “As excessive as 
it may seem, these tips can save time and money in returning your home and life to 
normal.”155  
  In other cases, these sources of information give great care and energy to 
detailing the local on-the-ground conditions related to flooding, while giving much less 
(and sometimes no) attention to preparedness. As an example, High Water: A Guide to the 
Colorado River/Highland Lakes Floodplains from Lampasas to Bastrop Counties is a 
highly polished and large book filed with full-color maps of the floodplains and water 
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ways in that region.
156
 This guide, and another from the Lower Colorado River Authority 
(LCRA), “The Colorado River Flood Warning Guide,” offers in-depth details about 
floodplains, flood levels, dam capacity and discharge levels, weather broadcast station 
information and other technical information. The latter guide offers not a single piece of 
information about how to respond to flood warnings. Likewise, the 168-page High Water 
guide offers only two pages of summary instruction on protecting oneself against floods. 
 In general, both national and local sources of information for flood education take 
efforts to provide people with basic information about how to prepare. This information 
ranges from basic statements such as “get an emergency kit” to more detailed instruction 
about how to guard against flood losses by securing one’s home. Occasionally, local 
sources of information are more instructive than national sources, in part because local 
sources link the information to on-the-ground floodplain conditions. Overall, however, 
few of these materials make efforts to explain to people that taking these actions will 
reduce losses in the future, which would enhance their effectiveness. 
Question 3:  Do the program materials repeat messages multiple times, from 
 multiple sources, through multiple channels of communication? 
 
 As noted earlier, the flood community lacks a coalition of agencies and 
organizations working jointly to message flood preparedness. It also lacks a popular or 
effective slogan for focusing public attention on flood risk and preparedness. As such, 
most of the information that comes across in various flood education materials is 
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disjointed in language, tone and content. Further, because there is not a consistent 
campaign structure, materials are often disseminated through isolated or ineffective 
channels. 
 Some themes emerge consistently in the materials, such as the previously 
mentioned division of flood response behaviors into “before,” “during,” and “after” flood 
categories. Many efforts also try special approaches for children (see, for an example, the 
Clark County Regional County Flood Control District’s “Kid’s Page”),157 and many 
sources prioritize vehicle safety during floods above other kinds of messages. Most 
materials recommend that people “get an emergency kit” or “make a plan,” though it 
varies to what extent they will elaborate on what should be in a kit or plan. 
 Beyond these broad themes, the materials fail to identify specific, repeated 
messages about how to prepare. Most of FEMA’s flood education materials is 
disseminated online, and has been reviewed in the preceding sections on the first two best 
practices (demonstrating preparedness actions and providing information about actions to 
take to prevent future losses). But in addition to the Ready.gov and FloodSmart 
initiatives, FEMA publishes technical bulletins and brochures about, for instance, how to 
prepare and repair one’s home and belongings,158 or how and why to buy flood 
insurance.
159
 FEMA also offers a major publication, Are you Ready? An In-depth Guide 
to Citizen’s Preparedness, for a range of hazards, including natural hazards.160  These 
brochures and guides are generally disseminated through insurance and federal offices or 
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by request through the mail. As such, they are unlikely to capture large audiences not 
already seeking flood preparedness information. Generally, the bulletins are issued by 
FEMA alone, without partners, and so these messages come to people in isolated pockets.  
The messages are not consistently blanketed, co-branded or easily found in multiple 
media. 
 One important point to emphasize about these materials is the graphic design 
quality of the materials. The earthquake materials, and particularly the ShakeOut 
materials, use a combination of bold graphic design and very little text to relay essential 
messages. Simple graphics and language, with important words repeated over and over 
(consider the frequent use of “Drop, Cover, Hold On” across all materials) make it easy 
for readers to quickly grasp key points. In contrast, much of the flood education material, 
such as Floods: The Awesome Power (and other NWS materials), use text-heavy formats 
that do not present a clear plan of action for those engaged in a cursory review of the 
materials.
161
 
 There are exceptions. The NWS “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” campaign, for 
instance, is effective as an example of how dense information can be repeated through 
multiple channels, from multiple sources, multiple times. This short and simple slogan 
has been emblazoned on stickers, posters, magnets, videos, street signs and other 
materials, and has been used by various organizations engaged in flood education. It uses 
a simple graphic image – a yellow road sign – to accompany the short phrase. NWS 
liberally encourages the use of the phrase by other organizations. As mentioned above, 
the “Turn Around, Don’t Drown” campaign is also effective because it invites the 
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participation of partner organizations. When organizations such as the Nurture Nature 
Center or various river basin commissions take the campaign and employ it in their own 
materials, it reinforces the information for people through multiple sources, channels and 
over periods of time. As actionable risk theory explains for us, when individuals are then 
later faced with a wet road, they are more likely to have made it “their own idea” to 
“Turn Around, Don’t Drown.” 
 In another productive instance of cross-germination of messaging between federal 
agencies, the Ready.gov site provides detailed explanations of the flood watch and 
warning terminology that is used by the National Weather Service. In fact, because these 
watches and warnings get so many people to begin their preparedness actions, many 
organizations take care to explain these terms to the public. The City of Boulder, 
Colorado, as an example, lists the definitions on their website, though it offers essentially 
no other flood preparedness information.
162
 Unfortunately, by the time watch and 
warning messages have been issued, the time for preparation has often passed. But this 
effort to promote a general understanding of the watch and warning terminology aligns 
with the best practice of co-branding information and repeating it through multiple 
channels. It is also likely to result in a more informed public that can better respond to 
announcements of flood watches or warnings. 
 Additionally, NOAA’s Weather-Ready Nation campaign has momentum for 
providing dense information, as it engages multiple media sources to spread its main 
message, which is to “Be a Force of Nature.” Materials sharing this same message can be 
found online, in print, and are disseminated through public service announcements.  
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Further, the campaign invites people to start their own education programs in their own 
location. In contrast to the ShakeOut, however, the campaign is branded by NOAA alone, 
without a series of partners, which may decrease its legitimacy in the public mind, and 
may also have the result of “branding the messenger” instead of the message. 
 Because there is no central repository for flood preparedness information, many 
individuals look to their local communities for information. The Lower Colorado River 
Authority (LCRA), for instance, has produced an extensive number of materials about 
flooding in that region, including brochures about driving safety, large maps complete 
with information about river gages and weather radio stations, and general weather safety 
guides. The Clark County Regional Flood Control District in Nevada has conducted 
extensive flood education programs for its community, including school programs, flood 
safety advertising campaigns, and the creation of a “Flood Channel” that provides news  
about flooding.
163
 Efforts such as these vary in quality depending on the resources 
available, and they generally follow the national models with respect to their level of 
success at meeting the first two best practices. I mention them here because they present 
missed opportunities for repeating messages multiple times through multiple channels.  
 Whereas the LCRA produces a full-color, beautifully produced wall-sized guide 
to the flood warning stages and broadcast information related to various dams and 
locations on the Colorado River (complete with technical details about historic crest 
levels, lake volume and the discharge capacity of dams), this guide fails entirely to 
mention a single safety step in preparing for floods beyond listening for evacuation 
information. If organizations were able, instead, to agree upon a few key preparedness 
steps, such guides could quickly become valuable preparedness tools for disseminating 
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messages easily through various media. 
 On the positive side, and presumably as a result of an effort to maximize limited 
resources for printing and other costs, these organizations often do a good job of co-
branding messages. As an example, the LCRA's brochure, “Danger: Flooded Roadway 
Ahead” is co-branded by an area emergency medical organization, a local news station, a 
fire department and other groups.
164
 Such a technique is common among smaller non-
profit organizations, who offer to print organizational logos on brochures in exchange for 
support from these organizations to cover the costs of printing or staff time. The effect is 
to brand the message, and it aligns with the best practice of repeating information through 
multiple sources. 
 Overall, national organizations have not taken a lead role in identifying key flood 
messages that can be repeated through multiple channels and sources. With limited 
resources local organizations are not likely to be successful in undertaking such a 
strategy, and this review of their materials suggests they have not. The national 
organizations, however, could take a lesson from the regional groups and consider how to 
co-brand their messages across the various federal agencies. Local organizations could 
then follow suit. 
2. Milling 
  
 Though historically flood educators have not successfully promoted extensive 
milling, recent efforts make progress in acknowledging the influence of social networks 
on people’s decisions to prepare. Even more fully than the ShakeOut initiative, Weather- 
Ready Nation uses social media including Twitter and Facebook applications to spread 
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their news. Further, during the 2012 National Severe Weather Preparedness Campaign, 
FEMA and NOAA collaboratively promoted the “Pledge to Prepare” campaign, which 
encourages people to register and join the National Preparedness Coalition.
165
 The site 
explains that members “will be able to collaborate with thousands of fellow members 
across the country on ways to participate and get your community involved.” Once 
registered, participants can link to discussion forums on topics related to preparedness.  
FEMA’s link to this campaign goes further to recognize the influence of social networks 
on motivating others to prepare by suggesting that pledging will “inspire others to act.”166  
It promotes milling about preparedness by telling others to be “an example” and further 
encourages individuals to “tell other others about it!”167 
Ill. 4.10 FEMA “Pledge to Prepare” 
 
 
NOAA’s Weather-Ready Campaign is even more explicit about the power of social 
networks, noting on its home page that “being a force of nature means inspiring others to 
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do the same through setting an example in your community and social networks.”168  
These steps are an advance in previous and long-standing efforts by floodplain managers 
to address flooding as a matter of community cooperation. Because flooding can happen 
in small localized areas, floodplain managers have often encouraged neighborhoods to 
plan together. The Yardley Flood Book, for instance, proposes “[Y]our neighborhood is a 
part of your home. Neighbors need to look out for one another. Do you have your 
neighbors’ phone number? During an evacuation you may want to stay in contact with 
one another.”169 Such language is not uncommon in flood education materials. Several 
materials suggest that neighborhoods call together planning meetings to discuss 
neighborhood vulnerabilities for floods.
170
 
 While these efforts demonstrate that flood managers are aware of the need for 
collaboration and interaction within the members of a community, in general, they have 
focused on connecting neighbors during an acute flood event. There have been few 
concerted efforts to sustain a social dialogue about preparedness behaviors in advance of 
an event, as has been undertaken by the earthquake communities. For example, 
floodplain managers have not encouraged individuals to exchange photos of their 
preparedness behaviors, and they have not generally engaged organizations such as 
workplaces and churches to host preparedness events. Thus, although the national efforts 
by NOAA and FEMA seem to suggest that this tide may be turning, significant steps 
remain in fully integrating milling activities into flood education campaigns and 
programs. 
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3. Community Identity Around Risk 
 In comparison to the earthquake community, very few of the historical and current 
efforts to educate the public about preparedness for flooding call upon community and 
collective responses, or engender a sense of community belonging. One historical effort 
that achieved some success was Project Impact, a federal program organized through 
FEMA that aimed to build “disaster-resistant communities” that would be safer in the 
face of flood risk. This program (which has now been defunded) shows signs of 
intentionally building community identity around risk, and was by design, a local 
community approach to flood loss reduction and education.
171
 A brochure for the program 
describes the well-documented way that communities pull together in the wake of 
disaster, and then calls upon communities to use that spirit now, before the crisis hits:  
“But imagine if damage could be avoided by taking steps before the disaster.  Project 
Impact is about tapping that same collaborative spirit BEFORE the disaster strikes.”172  
This language assumes the reader has (and evokes for those who do not) a community 
understanding about one’s responsibility to one’s neighbors. Such assumptions should 
underlie materials that aim to cultivate a community identity around risk, and Project 
Impact was headed in the right direction in that regard. 
 Few other national efforts have taken this approach, despite their common 
references to community and neighborhoods in flood education materials. Floods: The 
Awesome Power booklet, as an example, features a section on “What My Community 
Can Do.” This booklet also calls for Community Preparedness Plans,173 as do other 
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national and local materials. But these discrete references to community most often 
conjure images of communities and neighborhoods as groups of people who can form 
committees to carry out technical tasks. They do not invite the participant to perceive of 
themselves as part of a larger collective preparing for floods. They do not, for instance, 
invite participants to join others in a large exercise, or advise them to “share their 
experience” with others around them. While the bold design of the earthquake materials 
draws attention to, and in multiple media invites responses from the participants (by 
submitting their own story, or by emailing links to friends), the calls for community 
participation in the flood materials are generally efforts to get emergency management 
and municipal officials talking to residents who have experienced flooding. This latter 
connection is an important piece of helping the community to understand flooding, but is 
different than creating a community identity around risk. Creating a community identity 
around risk is an intentional effort to call upon collective responses to flooding so that 
residents feel “we are flood-ready.” It is also about engendering a sense of community 
belonging, which evokes the feeling that “I'm part of a flood-ready community, so I 
prepare.” Such efforts are hard to find among flood education campaigns. As with 
milling, however, the floodplain management community is advancing its understanding 
about how to cultivate such a sense of community belonging and responsibility through its 
flood education messages.  The Weather-Ready Nation campaign does not shy away from 
evoking the image of social movements, and explicitly states it is starting a “national 
movement for preparedness.”174 Weather-Ready Nation materials provide examples of 
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individuals who properly prepared and responded to weather risk (including flood risk) 
and survived in the face of extreme weather. These then invite the public to join and also 
“Be a Force of Nature.” These personal stories are compelling, and they challenge the 
reader to conceive of themselves in similar situations. I question, though, whether the “Be 
a Force of Nature” slogan has the unintended effect of connecting the participant to the 
hazard, rather than to a community that has formed in response to the hazard. In other 
words, rather than eliciting a community response that can motivate preparedness, this 
campaign runs the risk of focusing back on individual responses – “I can be a Force of 
Nature,” rather than “We are Together Forces of Nature.” By calling on individuals to 
take an action, to “Be” a force of nature, the campaign slogan subtly suggests that they 
must become something they are not yet. Presumably, the assumption is that they must 
become prepared.   
 The campaign also finds some success in its logo design, which is simply 
designed, with a small swirl suggestive of a serious weather and wind event. The graphic 
design elements are bold and light on text, which help to draw the reader in, and the 
swirl, which echoes a large wind event, reminds the viewer of their risk of severe 
weather.  But as with the slogan, the logo does not connect the viewer to a larger 
community.  The Weather-Ready Nation logo instead connects people to the call to 
prepare.  
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Ill. 4.11 “Be a Force of Nature” logo from Weather-Ready Nation175  
(from http://www.nws.noaa.gov/com/weatherreadynation) 
 
 
 By way of comparison, the ShakeOut logo (recall the outline of California with a 
subtle tectonic plate crack in the middle) unites everyone precisely as they are, where 
they are: as earthquake-prone Californians. In this case, the call is not to become 
something, or to prepare, but is instead to conceive of oneself in a community risk 
perspective. The distinction here is subtle, but worth reflecting on if we are to embrace 
the importance of fostering a community identity that triggers a collective motivation to 
prepare. 
 Despite its limitations, the Weather-Ready Nation campaign does have substantial 
merits in treating preparedness as something people do because of a commitment to 
community. Therefore, it should be studied in coming years to see how this element 
develops. The program calls upon individuals to inspire others to act in recognition of the 
influence of community actions on neighbors and the need for collective responses. And 
although the campaign is branded by NOAA alone, the project recognizes that being 
successful requires the partnership of “government agencies and emergency managers, 
researchers, the media, insurance industry, non-profits, the private sector and more.”  
Weather-Ready Nation falls short of cultivating a community identity around risk, but it 
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is the most promising of the efforts studied here.   
 Another interesting initiative to consider in light of a community identity 
approach to risk response is the ASFPM's “No Adverse Impact” program, which 
encourages communities to enforce local regulations on floodplain management in excess 
of what the federal minimum standards require. ASFPM describes: 
 
  “No Adverse Impact Floodplain Management is a managing principle that is easy 
 to communicate and, from legal and policy perspectives, tough to challenge. In 
 essence, No Adverse Impact floodplain management takes place when the actions 
 of one property owner are not allowed to adversely affect the rights of other 
 property owners.”176 
 
While ASFPM envisions that a No Adverse Impact (NAI) approach will be measured by 
reductions in physical outputs such as flood peaks and velocities, the organization also 
allows the community to identify other impacts it considers important. It also allows for 
different definitions of community, ranging from municipality to watershed regions. 
What NAI requires is that communities establish their own standards and criteria, and 
then apply community penalties to those who adversely impact the floodplain. In doing 
so, ASFPM presents NAI as a challenge to communities that have historically accepted 
what are regarded as low federal standards. But NAI is primarily a policy principle 
oriented toward the management of land use. While it does embrace a community 
philosophy for loss mitigation, it does not extend that philosophy into motivating 
preparedness at either the community or individual level. As I discuss below, however, 
the NAI philosophy may be flexible enough for use in this capacity. 
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 In sum, the floodplain management community has not endeavored to build a 
community identity around flood risk. Although this field has often called upon 
communities to respond to flooding, it has done so in a technical sense, often by asking 
for the formation of committees to assess vulnerabilities. Flood managers as an aggregate 
group have not endeavored to call on collective or community responses to risk, or to 
engender a sense of community belonging in order to motivate community preparedness 
actions. But this context provides much opportunity. Some tools and templates, such as 
the Project Impact framework, the No Adverse Impact approach, and the Weather-Ready 
Nation campaign start moving in this direction, and provide the basis for success in this 
area. 
C.  Recommendations: How to Improve Flood Policy and Education 
 Many recommendations follow from the theoretical framework for flood 
education I have proposed and used to compare the successes and failures of the 
earthquake and floodplain management communities. In the remainder of this paper I will 
discuss these options and then turn to reflecting on future research.  
Best Practices 
 First, let us consider how the floodplain management community might apply the 
best practices in their current and future campaigns. As conceived in the theoretical 
framework proposed in Part III of this paper, the best practices require that messages 
about risk achieve three ends. They must: 1) demonstrate preparedness actions 2) provide 
information about actions to take to reduce losses; and 3) repeat the actions multiple 
times from multiple sources and through multiple channels.  
 The preceding analysis shows that the floodplain management community finds 
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its greatest success in providing information about actions to take, but that it has not been 
able to effectively coordinate messages about actions across institutions (that is, from 
multiple sources). This lack of consistency and failure to repeat messages leaves 
individuals without a clear sense of what actions they should take, and, importantly, about 
why they should take them. In order to achieve these goals, the floodplain management 
community’s most prominent need is a loosely knit group of organizations that jointly 
agree to message flood safety and preparedness in consistent and cooperative ways. 
Consider the Earthquake Country Alliance, or the regional working bodies that guide the 
ShakeOuts in various locations in California, as examples of how collaborations of 
institutions and agencies can jointly message key preparedness concepts while retaining 
their own institutional missions. The Redwood Coast Tsunami Work Group, a Humboldt 
University-sponsored group focused on tsunamis and earthquakes, can spread the “Drop, 
Cover, Hold On” message alongside the California Earthquake Authority, which is the 
insurance authority for earthquakes in the state. The floodplain management community 
should develop its own version of the Earthquake Country Alliance, or some other 
institutional mechanism by which the various federal, state, regional and non-profit 
organizations vested in flood education can develop a comprehensive strategy for 
messaging flood preparedness.  
 This organizational entity or mechanism should also take efforts, as the 
earthquake sector did, to learn from the findings of the most current social science 
research about human behavior, so that flooding messages respond to these best practices 
and incorporate other understandings of social behavioral phenomena related to risk 
preparedness. Consider the earthquake preparedness community’s messaging workshops 
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that were sponsored by the California Emergency Management Agency and the 
California Earthquake Authority in 2011. These workshops informed the earthquake 
community about the values that consumers respond to concerning preparedness for 
earthquakes. The summary report for this exercise, prepared in October 2011, explains 
that earthquake agencies intend to create a “shared plan for different programs” that 
allows various sectors to use “the same research-based messages in different, yet 
coordinated programming throughout the diverse earthquake preparedness arena.”177  
Thus, an allied approach allows for agencies to carry out their own discrete tasks, but 
with coordinated messaging to the public. Such an approach in the flooding sector could 
allow for a central organizing flood education slogan, based on social science research 
about what motivates flood preparedness. 
 In the floodplain field, a broad organizing entity should encompass organizations 
such as FEMA, NWS, ASFPM, USGS, and other non-profit organizations involved in 
flood science, education, recovery and training. This group should include staff from 
outreach and education departments as well as physical scientists, so that all participants 
can learn to use the same messages when dealing with the public. While the social 
science literature suggests that leading with science information about risks is not 
sufficient for motivating preparedness, adding scientific explanations into messages does 
add credibility and legitimacy, and it is important that scientists be part of the public 
discussion. Specifically, it is the probabilities of risk that people tune out, but when these 
probabilities are put in a broader scientific context of the physical processes and patterns 
of flooding, they can help to increase people’s confidence in other things they have heard.  
Therefore, science-trained employees should be provided with training about the key 
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messages individuals need for motivating preparedness, so that the employees can 
intersperse these messages with their other, physical science knowledge when talking to 
public audiences. 
 The first task of this broader organizational entity I am proposing should be to 
identify a core set of preparedness steps the public should take, and a concise way to 
convey these (akin to “Drop, Cover, Hold On”) steps. Should people practice for a flood 
event? Perhaps not, but maybe it is important that people receive warnings about when to 
prepare and evacuate, through messages such as  "Be In the Know About When To Go."  
The Nurture Nature Center in Easton, PA has adopted a short phrase, “Floods Happen. 
Lessen the Loss.”178 to encompass the message that floods are natural, to be expected, 
and that losses can be reduced. This message might be coordinated with specific action 
steps to complete the messaging. 
 My review of the flood education materials also suggests some cautions for 
floodplain managers. Because images of flood damage are so prolific (victims and 
onlookers often document flood events), they are easily and often shared in public 
education materials. Video footage of extreme flood scenarios, for instance, showing 
victims in perilous situations or waters rising above legendary monuments, are frequently 
incorporated into websites and brochures. While these images are effective for explaining 
the capacity of flood waters to create damage, they are not effective at motivating 
preparedness. Given actionable risk communication theory’s emphasis on demonstrating 
preparedness behaviors, educators should avoid the use of images of cars underwater, and 
should instead share images of cars turning away from wet roads.  Likewise, rather than 
sharing high-drama high-water photos, programs should encourage and incorporate 
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photos of individuals taking preparedness actions, such as putting together emergency 
kits, turning off utilities, or calling friends and family with news of an impending flood 
event. Such efforts need not be solely the province of national or well-funded education 
campaigns. Community organizations and municipalities could invite these photos and 
post them on existing blogs and news sources, or even community bulletin boards. Such 
changes in message can happen over time, as organizations renew their materials or 
update their websites, even absent a coordinated campaign. The collective effect of these 
changes in small materials would be to very quickly to change the images of flood 
education from ones focusing on disaster and damage, to ones of preparedness and 
action. 
 Further, educators should consider the authority that is presenting the flood 
education message, and should endeavor to co-brand their message with as many partners 
as possible. Mileti advises co-branding all warning messages with the local fire 
department, based on research suggesting that firefighters are the most trusted authority 
in America today.
179
  Such an approach might also be effective for general preparedness 
messages, as well as acute warning messages. This could emerge at the national level, as 
has been done with the ECA and the ShakeOut, but should also happen at the local level.  
Local and regional communities can identify their own tier of important local messages 
and ask their firefighters and swift water rescue teams to help disseminate these 
messages, through pot-luck dinners, letters to residents or other means. For instance, 
communities that have difficulty encouraging residents to evacuate during flood events 
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might have rescuers and firefighters demonstrate proper evacuation techniques. In 
communities where residents have difficulty receiving alerts about upcoming floods, 
these first responders might help municipalities to set up local phone trees or other 
communications plans with the residents. The point is to engage multiple authorities 
within the community in presenting flood preparedness information, so that the 
community can come to integrate those ideas as their own.  As a corollary to this idea, 
communities – and national programs – should consider building programs that get the 
media to focus specifically on how to present information about flood risk accurately, in 
order to reduce errors in public judgment that result from incorrect media information. 
Milling 
 The theoretical framework proposed in this paper also requires that educators 
consider how to promote milling through flood education messages. Rather than 
presenting preparedness as something that one does by oneself, messages should 
emphasize the importance of sharing of preparedness information with neighbors, or 
others in one's community. For instance, programs could encourage neighbors to 
“Prepare, Then Share” the news about their readiness actions. This kind of campaign asks 
more of individuals than merely preparing; it asks them also to spread news of their 
actions with close friends, neighbors, family and social media contacts. 
 Existing services and programs can also be adapted in minor ways to increase 
milling about flood preparedness. For instance, NWS flood watches and warnings could 
include a short statement encouraging readers to notify friends and families about the 
alert. FEMA’s “Pledge to Prepare” initiative could invite submissions of photos and 
stories of preparedness behaviors, much as the ShakeOut does. The next edition of the 
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Awesome Power booklet could emphasize through photos and words the “awesome 
power” of individuals to influence and help others to prepare, rather than emphasizing the 
extreme devastation of floods. Subtle changes over time can be incorporated at low cost, 
with high impact. 
 Communities might also consider special efforts to improve preparedness 
understanding among audiences most likely to share that information with others.  
Consider the informal risk communicators identified in Rickard's study: these 
professionals did not merely apply commercial pesticides, they also informally explained 
the risks of doing so to their customers.
180
 In the flooding context, such informal risk 
communication might come from landscapers, plumbers and other tradespeople that are 
often called in to remedy and prevent flood damages. Targeted messages to these groups 
about the best ways to prepare might quickly move throughout the community, and 
promote milling among those who have solid, reliable information to share. 
 As seen from the ShakeOut campaign, a highly effective approach to promoting 
milling is presenting a high-stakes scenario that can inspire communities to learn more 
about how to protect themselves against extreme risk. For the floodplain management 
community, this might mean creating a large shared project – organized by the loose 
coalition of organizations mentioned above – that can focus broad interest on flood risk in 
the United States, or a particular region. The project might involve creating a website or 
publication, or other major events such as a special “Flood Day” that can potentially 
provide a focal point for media and the public. For the East Coast of the United States an 
ideal initial project could be the creation of a scenario depicting damage from flood levels 
equivalent to those of the historic 1955 flood of record in the region. This tremendously 
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damaging flood event, which occurred as a result of two major hurricanes drenching the 
eastern seaboard, caused extensive loss of life and property. Multi-generational stories, 
epic photos and memorabilia from the flood have captured and held the public memory 
and interest for nearly 60 years. Creating a scenario that demonstrated how those same 
flood levels would impact the East Coast of the United States today could renew public 
interest in understanding how to guard against such an event, and promote milling 
accordingly. 
Community Identity Around Risk 
 To fully engage the motivations of the public to prepare, educators need to move 
beyond the promotion of milling to consider also how messages can cultivate a 
community identity around risk. For instance, the Weather-Ready Nation campaign, 
which has already identified a plan to start a national movement for preparedness, could 
apply its strategy specifically to the cause of flooding and create a “River-Ready” or 
“Stream-Ready” program specifically for flooding. Rather than promoting that people can 
“Be a Force of Nature,” the River and Stream-Ready programs could emphasize that “We 
are River (or Stream) Ready.”  Recalling the ShakeOut logos that so effectively layered 
risk upon geography, the logos for such a campaign could be interchangeable with 
outlines of river basins, or could be comprehensive of larger regions or even the entire 
country. The point would be to connect the experience of flood risk to the community 
identity, such as it may be defined in any given campaign. 
 Further, all flood risk messages should be tiered to emphasize first the community 
responsibility and belonging involved in preparing for floods; and second, the best 
practices and promotion of milling. This order is not a matter of priority – all three 
104 
 
components are essential for effective motivation – but rather of effective marketing. 
Because the idea of tiered messages inherently presumes that some people will only catch 
the first message, the notion here is to engage as broad a population in connecting to 
preparedness as possible. By calling first on the collective response, the messages are 
likely to move more rapidly through the community via social networks, and to have the 
content of the messages (as embedded in the best practices) shared and reinforced 
through community dialogue. Further, these messages should also engage the idea that 
river variability is a normal and expected part of river life, and that this variability is part 
of the community experience. Materials should emphasize the actions taken now to 
prepare for flooding can reduce risk later, not merely for oneself, but for the community 
at large. 
 Given environmental justice concerns related to the disparity of impacts from 
flood disasters,  special attention must be paid to the ways that building a community 
identity around risk can bring together entire communities, and not just subcultures and 
subgroups. Some social science research has explored the ways that symbols of popular 
culture can unite various class and cultural groups around a common disaster.   
Quarantelli, et al., for instance, studied the spread of yellow ribbons as signs of solidarity 
in the wake of tragedies. The researchers first saw the trend on their own campus, after 
the World Trade Centers collapsed on September 11, 2001, and saw it re-emerge as a 
show of solidarity after Hurricane Katrina.
181 
Further investigation of popular cultural 
documents suggests that this kind of solidarity is a somewhat frequent response to 
tragedy and loss associated with disasters. Notably, the effects of such symbolism persist 
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across “different social systems and cultural patterns, as well as different kinds of 
collective crises.”182 Thus, there may be an important role for the use of symbolism in 
bringing together diverse members of a community to collectively define and represent 
community identity and meaning surrounding hazards, including flooding. One specific 
question to look at in this regard is how such symbolism could work to solidify a social 
norm for preparedness across classes, races and other demographic variations. 
 Environmental justice considerations require us to reconsider, too, the ways in 
which emergency management and other organizations present flood information to 
public audiences. While traditionally flood hazard information has come in a top-down 
format from emergency management offices or federal agencies, in the context of 
sometimes dramatic inequalities of race and class, the effort to create a community 
identity around risk requires a different approach. Paton describes a participatory 
approach to flood education in which communities are actively involved in discussing 
and defining the relevant issues related to flooding in their region, and in shaping 
community response plans.
183
 ASFPM's No Adverse Impact planning principle similarly 
makes room for communities to establish the standards and areas of concern for 
themselves, rather than the authority of the federal government. 
 Such participatory approaches could also be applied to the pre-planning stage of 
motivating preparedness among individuals and households, but they must be inclusive of 
the entire community across the categories of race, class and geography that define the 
actual community at risk. Busy officials might perceive that targeting floodplain residents 
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for education is a more effective use of time, but if effective flood response requires a 
community understanding of river variability and joint responsibility, then educating only 
the floodplain residents will fail to create a response that is truly collective. Similarly, 
using outreach materials that only reach higher income audiences, such as Internet-based 
appeals and techniques, will fail to reach those without access to that technology.  Even 
in the earthquake community, reaching audiences without Internet is still a challenge, and 
is being actively addressed by transferring information through alternative venues, such 
as schools, hospitals and workplaces. The same is true with English-only appeals in 
communities where multiple languages are spoken. 
 Additionally, flood educators must consider carefully the values to which the 
intended audiences will respond, and should not assume a shared value system among all 
members of a community. While all campaigns will not have the capacity to engage in 
research such as that conducted by Harris Interactive for the earthquake messaging sector, 
the proposed floodplain management collaborative organization could undertake such a 
project to better understand the sorts of values that various populations hold related to 
flood response. They could then share these results with the rest of the floodplain 
management community so that all organizations could work together in creating 
messages that respond to communities’ expressed values surrounding preparedness. 
Part V. CONCLUSION 
 This paper has developed and applied a framework for evaluating and designing 
the activities and materials of education campaigns that are intended to motivate public 
preparedness for flood risk. Three features are central to this framework. First, drawing 
on actionable risk theory, I have argued that a series of three best practices should be 
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incorporated into flood education materials and programming. These practices involve 
demonstrating preparedness actions, providing information about actions to take to 
reduce losses, and repeating information through multiple sources and channels. Second, 
I have also argued that these practices should incorporate activities that promote milling, 
which is an effective way to turn citizens into educators of fellow citizens about natural 
hazards. Third, drawing on social movement and social network theory, I have argued 
that flood education activities should aim to create a community identity around flood-
related risk, so that preparedness becomes recognizable as a matter of collective meaning 
and value to those who can and do share a way of life with rivers and the natural systems 
that make up river areas. Each of these components of flood preparedness education and 
programming are crucial to improving citizens’ responses to flooding risk. Thus, for the 
purpose of improving on current practice, I have compared current flood education 
activities and materials to the highly successful activities and materials characterizing the 
earthquake management community’s approach to public preparedness.  
 While flood campaigns have taken some important steps to better motivate 
citizens to prepare for flooding, they remain insufficient in many ways. For the purpose 
of improving existing programs, I have drawn on the theoretical framework explained 
above, as well as the successful practices of the earthquake preparedness community to 
offer a series of specific recommendations for improving flood management education, 
especially on the eastern seaboard. These recommendations include creating a coalition 
of floodplain management groups that can jointly message key action steps for 
preparedness through a central organizing program, such as through a scenario project 
demonstrating modern-day impacts of the 1955 flood crests on the East Coast. 
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Additionally, I recommend approaches for creating new and modifying existing programs 
such as the Weather-Ready Nation campaign so that they better incorporate messages of 
community identity and the collective need to prepare. Finally, I propose adapting federal 
services such as the NWS flood watch and warnings system, so that it better promotes 
milling behaviors and successfully engenders a community identity around risk. 
 This framework and set of recommendations are especially important in light of 
the significant resources that are currently required to deal with domestic flood damages. 
Specifically, annual flood losses in the United States are currently around $8 billion. 
Federal, state and local governments spend hundreds of millions more in structural and 
non-structural projects to prevent these losses. In recent years, premiums paid into the 
National Flood Insurance Program have outpaced its ability to pay claims, leaving large 
taxpayer debts as a result. Further, as I have shown here, the money that governments do 
spend on programs to motivate preparedness for flooding is often misspent, as these 
programs fail to incorporate effective education strategies. Even small improvements in 
programs that intend to motivate preparedness, therefore, have the potential to result in 
significant economic gains by reducing government spending on flood losses.  
 More generally, it is increasingly clear that the burden to prevent flood losses 
must be borne by the public as well as by governments. Effective public policies should 
devote resources to preventing problems, rather than cleaning up the problems after they 
occur. Given the rising cost of flood damages, it is hard to imagine an area where this is 
more important than in the area of flooding. How to convey this message of partnership 
and responsibility is the challenge. Without a clear understanding of what motivates 
preparation, governments will likely continue to fail to provide successful education 
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programming. The framework proposed here draws on existing research about what 
motivates preparedness, and also advances a new consideration about how building a 
community identity around risk can offer an alternative, and possibly more successful, 
approach for individuals and agencies aiming to motivate preparedness in one specific 
area of public policy. 
 Although the proposals I have advance here draw on recent social science 
research on human behavior, it is important to note that the theory and practice of flood 
education is an evolving field, and one that is of critical importance in the 21st Century. 
Much additional research remains to be completed if severe flood losses are to be avoided 
in the future. A promising area for further research is in identifying which participatory 
approaches can best motivate public preparedness across lines of race and class. For 
instance, community workshops that invite ordinary citizens to act as an authority on how 
to ready for floods in their own communities might overcome expert-lay conflicts in 
ways that help to build a community identity around risk. Federal and other agencies 
often struggle with how to present flood mitigation projects to flood-damaged 
communities, especially when those communities feel underserved by the agencies. New 
types of education collaborations could help these organizations (including science-based 
agencies such as NOAA and United States Geological Survey) to communicate their 
science knowledge alongside residents’ knowledge in shared conversations, so that the 
experience and authority of the residents is also given full weight and consideration. 
 The principles embodied in this framework should also be considered in light of 
broader public policies and services. Public policies, such as the National Flood 
Insurance Program (NFIP), have tremendous regulatory power to influence the behaviors 
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of local communities. The Community Rating System (CRS) initiative of the NFIP for 
instance, encourages communities to take additional flood preparedness steps -- above the 
required minimum activities -- by providing reduced insurance premiums to communities 
that undertake certain advanced actions related to zoning, land use, building code and 
flood warning programs, among other topics. The CRS program could use its existing 
incentive system to motivate the use of best practices, milling and activities that cultivate 
the creation of a community identity around flood-related risk. National Weather Service 
could also create more substantial resources for preparedness, and link them directly to 
their flood forecast and warning products as they are issued, providing information about 
how to prepare exactly when it is most needed. 
 As noted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its 2001 Summary 
for Policymakers of Working Group II: “The costs of weather events have risen rapidly 
despite significant and increasing efforts at fortifying infrastructure and enhancing 
disaster preparedness.”184 Motivating public preparedness is a critical step in reducing 
these losses.  Further investigation into how the basic features of the theoretical 
framework for flood education that I have proposed here can infuse federal and other 
policies and services is crucial to effectively motivating public preparedness. With 
respect to the various agencies and laws addressing the increasingly important threat of 
flood related losses, motivating preparedness is an important goal. This proposal for 
building a community identity around risk is supported by research from other fields 
about the effectiveness of community identity in motivating collective action and 
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responses; however, more exploration will be necessary for fully understanding the 
nuances of how people understand their collective responsibilities related to risk 
preparedness. Because it is a growing hazard that affects so many communities in the 
United States, flooding stands out as a topic that is an excellent starting point for such an 
exploration. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
ASFPM:  Association of State Floodplain Managers 
CAL-EMA: California Emergency Management Agency 
ECA:   Earthquake Country Alliance 
FEMA:   Federal Emergency Management Agency 
LCRA: Lower Colorado River Authority 
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 
NFIP:  National Flood Insurance Program 
NWS:   National Weather Service 
RCTWG:  Redwood Coast Tsunami Working Group 
SCEC:  Southern California Earthquake Center 
USGS:  United States Geological Survey 
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